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Foreigndirect investment (FDI)playsan important role indevelopmentstrategies in
developing countries. In particular, policy makers in developing countries and
development agencies alike believe that FDI is growth enhancing, as suggested by
theirpolicystand(inparticular,promotingmeasurestofacilitateandattractFDI).FDI
isdifferent fromothertypesofcapital flowsas it involvesnotonlythecapital itself,
butalsotransfers intheformoftechnologydiffusionandskills,managerialexpertise
and know ?how, and the introduction of new processing methods (Rodrik and
Subramanian, 2008). These serve tomodernize the recipient economy and support
productivitygains,whichinturnareexpectedtoimprovegrowthperformance.

The evidenceof this thesis suggests that the flow of FDI in developing countries is
likely to be affected by high debt, high inflation, and constraints on the executive
(XCONST),market size and good infrastructurequality.However, the flowof FDI in
LatinAmericaand theCaribbean (LAC) isaffecteddifferently: infrastructure ismore
important(relativetodevelopingcountries)forthetypeofFDIattractedtoLAC.The
impactofFDIongrowthisdirecti.e.notconditionalonothercountrycharacteristics,
contrary toAlfaro et al. (2004),Hermes and Lensink (2003), and Borensztein et al.





growth and from growth to FDI. Political instability affects growth, but the effect
depends on the dimensions of political instability and appears to vary for different













it,Hewill take you through it. First, Imust say thanks toGod for the strengthand





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































capital flows to the realeconomy,arising from the recession thatstarted in2008 in
the US. This has adversely affectedmost developing countries, principally through
reductionsinexports(asworlddemandfalls)andcapitalinflows.Thelatterisagainst
the backdrop that international capital flows, specifically foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows, have the potential to stimulate growth in developing countries. This




In the1980s,developing countries adapted their economieswith the aimof taking
advantage of globalization. In particular,most countries adopted policies to attract
internationalcapitalinflows,especiallyFDI.EastAsiaisoftencitedasevidenceforthe
unmitigated virtues of globalization. Successful replication, however, of East Asias
successes in other developing countries has been contested. In light of this
contestation,empiricalstudieshaveassistedpolicymakerstounderstandwhatworks,
where, underwhat conditions, andwhat does notwork. Some of these empirical
studies serve to informpoliciesmakersofways to integrate in theglobaleconomy,
suchasattractingandusingFDI.

In this vein, Asiedu (2001), Emmert and Tuman (1999) and others look at the
determinants of FDI in developing countries. These studies find macroeconomic
stability,tradepolicyand institutionsaskeymotivationsfordevelopingcountriesto,
firstofall,be consideredasgood location choices.As influentialas theseempirical
studies are in policy circles, many have not systematically addressed the location
choicesofinternationalinvestors.Akeyproblemwiththesestudiesisthattheyeither
employ limitedeconometricmethodology,orexcludekeyexplanatoryvariablesfrom





convincing proxy as many factors influence per capita GDP while the return on
investmentisappropriatelycapturedbythelevelofrealinterestrates.Inconsidering




Similarly, on the relationship between economic variables, this literature rarely
addressestheproblemofendogeneityinacomprehensivemanner.Theimplicationis





range of potential explanatory variables. If they are to inform policies, these
methodologicalanddataissuesshouldbeaddressed.Thisisimportant,asdeveloping
countries have lagged in their growth potential; only a handful of countries in the
developingworldboastgoodgrowthoutcomes:forexample,BotswanaandMauritius
in SSA, Chile in LAC, and those of East Asia. This provides huge opportunities for
developing countries to gain from their backwardness, and evidence grounded in
soundempiricalworkwillinformgoodpoliciesthatwillperhapsgeneratethesegains.

Another strandof this literature looksat thegrowtheffectofFDI. Inparticular, this
cluster of studies argues that FDI has a limited direct effect on growth in host
developingcountries;theeffectsofFDIareseenasconditionalonthevalueofother
variables.Theevidenceisbasedonpositivecoefficientsoninteractinglocalconditions











FDI takes to the host country specific knowledge about factor prices, and has the
technology togenerateparetoequilibriumbetween factor inputsandoutput levels.
Thus, these firmsareexporters (orservedomesticmarkets)whichachieveefficient ?
productivity thresholds, so its not clear that developing countries will not gain




IfAlfaroetal. (2004),HermesandLensink (2003),andBorenszteinetal. (1998)are





already have attained good financial systems, respectable levels of human capital
development,andotherdeterminantsofdevelopment tobenefit fromFDI isakin to
suggestingyoumustbegrowinginordertogrow.25

In this tradition, the literature also looks atwhether FDI affects growth in specific
regions. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) experimented with a range of
economicpolicies: starting in the1950s to1970swith import substitutionand from
theearly1980stowarda  moreopenorientation.Theneedforforeignexchangeto




they ignore the important issueof identification (inaneconometricsense)and they
dontconsiderthewiderregiontoincludetheCaribbean.

A related literature looks at the effect of FDI on growth, in particularwhether FDI







economyand international capitalgoeswhere returnsarehighest, itspossible that
theFDI ?growthrelationshipisdrivenbyreversecausality.Toignorethispossibilitywill
produce spurious estimates, so appropriate econometric methods are required to
correctforthisbias.

In contrast, the theoretical literature, in a neoclassical framework, predicts that
countrieswithalowcapital ?labourratioshouldattractcapitalfromrichcountrieswith
ahighratio(Prasadetal.2007).Capitalwill,therefore,continuetoflowfromrichto
poor countries until the capital ?labour ratio and thus the return differentials are
equalized across both (Lucas, 1990). This has not been observed in practice; in
absolute value, a largerproportionof capital flows to rich countries. Thismightbe






international capital doesnt flow to high ?growth countries relative to their slow ?
growth counterparts, the feedback effect between FDI and growth will not hold.
Accordingtothisinterpretation,ifaslowgrowthcountryreceivesagiveninflowofFDI
and itbeginsto improve itseconomicperformance,asthatcountrygraduatestothe
fast growth category, international capital flowswill be reallocated to slow growth
countries.Thereisalargeempiricalliteraturethatinvestigatesthisrelationship:Liand
Liu(2005),Durham(2004),Nair ?ReichertandWeinhold(2001),Mencinger(2001),and
others. But there is no consensus on the direction of causality in part because of
differentwaysofinvestigatingtherelationship.

Other studies introduce political instability to evaluate the relationship between










study thatdoesntarbitrarilyapply structure to the indicatorsofpolitical instability;
instead he applies a model  exploratory factor analysis  that systematically
constructstheindicesofpoliticalinstability.








FDI (Chapter 4) in a global sample of developing countries; we then investigate
whether LAC is different from the global sample of developing countries (in each
chapter). Finally,we investigate thepotentialendogenous relationshipbetween FDI
andeconomicgrowth (Chapter5). In this framework,weevaluate theeffectof the
different dimensions of political instability on growth and FDI, and assesswhether
thesedimensionsofpoliticalinstabilityaffectFDIandgrowthdifferentlyinSSA.

Aspointedout above,Asiedu (2001) andothers look at thedeterminantsof FDI in
developingcountries.WeextendtheAsiedu(2001)frameworkbyconsideringalarger
subset of potential explanatory variables and employ appropriate measures of






together,we hope to provide deeper insights on how domestic policies can affect
economicoutcomes,inparticularFDIanditscollateralbenefits.

Thenextgoal isto investigatethegrowtheffectofFDI.The literaturearguesthat, in
developing countries, thepositiveeffectofFDI is conditionalon local conditions, in
particulargood financial structuresandhuman capital.At firstblush,weargue that
6

thisextremeposition isconceptually flawed,not leastbecausedevelopingcountries
seek FDI because of development gaps. In the empirical essaywe re ?evaluate this
extremeposition, arguing that there is large scope for FDI to stimulate the growth
potential in developing countries, unconditional on local endowments;we provide
evidence to support this claim. Our approach is in the spirit of Borensztein et al.
(1998),butweextendthemodeltoincorporateotherdimensionsofdevelopment.We
decompose the sample into non ?LAC and LAC in order to investigatewhether FDI
affectsgrowthinLACdifferently.





weusevariables thatare significantpredictorsofFDI from thedeterminantsofFDI
analysis and significant variables from the growth analysis. We introduce three
dimensionsofpoliticalinstabilityinthesimultaneousequationsframework.Weargue
that political instability has different dimensions and thus affects growth and FDI
differently. We identify these dimensions of political instability, using exploratory
factoranalysis.Thekeyadvantageofusingexploratoryfactoranalysisoverassigning
structure to indicators is that it clusters those indicatorswith identical explanatory





whether the higher incidence of political instability affects economic performance
differentlyinSSA.

Hence our contribution to the empirical literature on FDI and growth is to provide
evidenceonthedeterminantsofFDIindevelopingcountries,inparticularhowLACis
affectedbythepotentialdeterminantsofFDI,providingevidencethatthere isscope








construct different models based on various assumptions and then proceed to




Chapter 2 provides a detailed description and discussion of the data used in the
subsequentempiricalchapters.Wediscusshoweachvariable isconstructedandplot
trendsovertimeandacrossregionsfordevelopingcountries,LAC,SSA,andAsia.This





affectsgrowthdifferently inLAC ina singleequation framework.The finalempirical
essay forms Chapter 5. In this essay we investigate the potential endogenous
relationshipbetweenFDIandgrowth.Toachieve thiswecombine theanalysis from
Chapters3and4 inasystemofsimultaneousequations.Further,we investigatethe
effectof threedimensionsofpolitical instabilityonFDIandgrowth in thesystemof
simultaneous equations, and examine if theres a political instability curse on SSA
























increased innovation, foreign exchange inflows, and improvement of human capital
development.Foreigndirect investment (FDI) is integraltothisprocess,aseconomic
growth isexpected to followFDI:we findempiricalsupport for thisargument in the
essays.Hence,manydevelopingcountrieshaveundertakenpoliciestoattractforeign
investors. The expected economic growth, however, has not been realised by all
developingcountries,thusgovernmentshavefocusedonspecifictypesofFDI:market
serving,exportorientedorresourceseeking.Thisnewstrategy involvesconditions
that allow FDI in partnership with local firms, to develop specific sectors of the
domesticeconomy,andtoincludecertainkindsoftechnologies.Despitethistendency
to pin down the potential beneficial effects of FDI, there is no unanimity in the
empirical literature that FDI does improve developing countries economic
performance, especially those that have structural failures  poor governance
structures,highincidenceofpoliticalinstability,andlowabsorptivecapacity.Asforthe





sampleof68middleand low income26developing countries from four regions: sub ?














































Most of the middle income countries are from LAC and East Asia, while SSA is













Foreigndirect investment (FDI) is thenet inflowsof investment toacquirea lasting
management interest(10percentormoreofvotingstock) inanenterpriseoperating




AriasandHausman (2000)whoargue thatFDI is justasourceof financewhichdoes
not include physical assets; physical assets constitute a firm and FDI is oneway of
acquiringthoseassets.WetakeourmeasureofFDIasthenetinflowsofFDI/GDPfrom
the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006). This measure subtracts






Somecountries in theannualdatahavenegativeFDI inflows;asweconstructpanel
averages of six five ?year (1975 ?79, 1980 ?84, 1985 ?89, 1990 ?94, 1995 ?99, 2000 ?05)
periods,we treat anynegative inflows as zero.As some countrieshave gaps in the
annual data, period averages allow us to smooth out these gaps. Figure 1 displays





















After 1979 the inflows todeveloping countries reduce steadily until themid ?1980s.
Duringthe1990sinflowstodevelopingcountriessurgewithasharprisefrom1996 ?99.
However,between1999and2004,inflowstodevelopingcountrieshavereduced,but























andAsia. LACandAsian countries share similar trendsofFDI/GDP, forboth regions
inflowsreducefrom1975to1977,increaseupto1981,andthenreduceforfouryears
ending1985.Duringthe late1980sandthedecadeofthe1990s,FDI/GDP inflows in
bothLACandAsiancountries indicateupward trends,butasteep fall in inflowswas
evidentfrom1999to2002,thiscanbeexplained(again)bythemildrecession inthe
US from 2000 ?01. LAC countries intensify liberalisation of their economies and
privatisationof state ?ownedenterprises in the1990s, this coincidedwith theboom
decadeofthe1990s.Thesedevelopmentsinteractedwithotherlocalandinternational
factorstoaffectthevolumeofFDI/GDP inflows.Viewedbroadly,the inflows forSSA
mirror thatofLACandAsiancountries. Its instructive that the1990 ?91 recession in
theUSdoesnotappeartoreduceinflowstoLAC,thiscontrastswithreductionsinASIA
andSSA.HistoricallyFDIinflowsinLACaremarketserving,whileinASIAandSSAFDIis
export oriented and resource seeking respectively. Adverse economic shocks in
developedmarketsaremorelikelytorestrictdemandfromFDIgearedforexportbut






























05, the leading recipients of inflows according to proportion of GDPwere Guyana









As an alternativemeasure, Figures3 and4 showplotsofnet FDI inflows inmillion
























illustrated in Figure 3 follow closely the trends observe for developing countries.






theUS,andbegin to riseagainafter2002.Obstfeld (2008)argues thatcapital flows
fromrichtodevelopingcountriessurgepost ?2002,thisisalsoillustrativeofthetrends
incapitalfinancialintegrationundertakenbydevelopingcountriesinAsiaandLACand
to a lesser extent SSA in the 1990s. These episodesof inflows are also reflected in
Figures1and2despiteusingFDI/GDPtomeasureFDIinflows.ForAsiatheinclusionof
ChinahasinfluencedtheplotsandBrazilhasdominatedforLACinFigures3and4.For
example the inflows toChina rangebetween$11,156 (1992) ?$79,127 (2005)million
and its closest rival, Singapore records inflows in the range $2,204 (1992) ?$19,815
(2004)million.FDIinflowstoBrazilrangebetween$345(1986) ?$32,779(2000)million,





Itsworthnoting thatasa shareofGDP,countriesofAsia receive relatively lessFDI
inflows.This issobecause theeconomiesofAsiaarebigger relative toSSAandLAC






In this sectionwediscussmeasurementsand trendsofother corevariablesused in
Chapters 3 and 4. These include  ameasure for the trade regime (OPEN) of the
economy,ameasureforinfrastructure(INFRAS)quality,ameasureforthesizeofthe
economy (GDPGR), ameasure for political instability (REVOLU), ameasure for debt
(DEBTSG), ameasure for institutional quality (XCONST), and ameasure for inflation
(INFLA). Chapter 4 also includes  a measure for the growth rate (GDPC) of the
economy, ameasure for human capital (HC), ameasure for financial development
(FinDev),ameasureforpoliticalinstability(Coups),andameasureforinitialincome.

Tocapture the trade regimeofacountryweuse thesumofexportsand importsof
goodsandservicesasashareofGDP.Thismeasure isbroaderthantheusualsumof




global economy,while a low ratio suggests a relatively closed economy. The trade
regimealsoindicateswhetherthepoliticalregimeislikelytorestrictthemovementof
capital inandoutof the countryorexpropriate foreign investorsassets.A country
thattradeswiththerestoftheworld is likelytoconformto internationalnormsand
practices,makingitmoretransparent,thuslesslikelytoengageinillegalpractices,for
example reneging on written contracts. For these reasons, the trade regime of a




























in LAC,except for the1990swhen LAC intensifies theiroutward lookandmid ?2000
wheredevelopingcountriesappeartobemoreopen.Thedivergence in2000sseems
tobe fuelledby the rapidoutwardorientationof EastAsian countries from around
2000.ThisalsosupportsclaimsthatAsiasgrowthisfuelledbyexports(infact,Chinas
trade surpluswith the US amounts tomore than 2 trillion dollars). Itsworth also
notingthatSSAappearsrelativelymoreopen,uptolate1980s,comparedtoLACand
Asia.An important critique,however,of this trade indexmeasure is that, since the
traderegimeisnormalisedbyGDP,acountrywhichhasasmalleconomymightappear
tobemoreopen relative to a countrywith a larger economy.Anotherwell known
problem with this trade volume measure is that it does not capture trade policy











that omits increasingly important mobile telephone and does not capture the
efficiencyofcommunicationservices;beingconnectedtothemainexchangedoesnot
ensure reliability of service. The efficiency of communication services is important
because it affects the costs of doing business, which is likely to influence where
investors locate.Foreign investorsthatservehostmarketswillbe interested ingood




























for LAC (Figure 7) and other regions (Figure 8). For all three regions, the stock of
infrastructure improves, but the improvement in Asia takes place at a faster rate
duringthe1990sandarelativelyslowerrateinSSAoverthesampleperiod.Thisisnot
surprising, becauseAsia and LAC are at a higher development trajectory and these
economiesarelarger,accountingformostmiddleincomedevelopingcountries.

Tomeasure themarket sizeweuse the Annualpercentage growth rateofGDP at




assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Development
Indicators, 2006).30Market serving FDI is attracted by large and growing economies
and this is reflected by the GDP. This series does not disaggregate the sources of
growthi.e.whetherthegrowthinGDPisduetoexpansionintherealeconomyordue






























The level of debt indicates how well the economy is being managed; high debt,





on long ?term debt, interest paid on short term debt, and repayments to the IMF
(World Development Indicators, 2006). 31 The advantage of this measure is that
creditorsarelikelytoidentifywhenacountryisspendingmorethanitsearning(with
thepossibility todefault) inorder to cease lending.Thismeasurealsohelps foreign
investorstodeterminewhengovernmentsare likelytoexpropriatetheir investments
becauseofexcessdebtobligation.Thiscausestheworryinmanydevelopingcountries





































We use constraint on the executive powers (XCONST), drawn from the Polity IV
project, to measure institutional qualities. The variable refers to the extent of
institutional constraints on the decision ?making powers of the chief executive,
whether an individual or a collective executive (Jaggers and Marshall, 2004: 63).
Accordingly,aclearstructure isestablishedfordecisionstobemade. Inademocracy
theexecutive isacountable to the legislatureandultimately to theelectorates.Thus
anydeviationfromtheruleoflawwillbepunishedthroughtheballots.Inprinciplethis
threat of punishment constrains policy makers to establish good governance
institutions,forexampleprotectpropertyrights,andadherencetotheruleof lawby







indicates more restrictions on the excutive power: unlimited authority (1);
intermediateauthority (2)32;slight tomoderate limitationonexecutiveauthority (3);




executive is ignored to rule by decree and category (7) includes other branches of
government (legislature) making most of the decisions to a state of cabinet
instabilityi.e.aconstantrefusalbythelegislaturetoapprovetheexecutivedecisions.

Dataon XCONSTonly covers 1975 to 2004.Countriesoscillate between categories,












































Figure 13 shows upward trends for both developing countries and LAC i.e. more
restrictionsonexecutivepowers,but LAC athigher levelsparticularly since the late
1970s. We disaggregate the regions in Figure 14; LAC appears to exert more
constraintsonexecutivepowersoverSSAandAsiaformostofthesampleperiod.SSA





be considered for long ?term investment opportunities. We approximate the
macroeconomicconditionsofacountryby the levelof inflation.This isgivenas the
annualpercentage change in the cost to the average consumerof acquiring a fixed
basketofgoodsandservicesthatmaybefixedorchangedatspecificintervals,suchas
yearly (WorldDevelopment Indicators,2006).35Thismeasure is just theCPI inflation
i.e.changes inthepricesofconsumptiongoods.Althoughthismeasure iscommonly
usedtoreflectinflation,itdoesnotcapturetheoverallpricelevelsinacountryasonly





changes regularly i.e. substitution bias. There is also discount bias i.e. consumers
sometimes purchase goods at cheaper prices compared to the prices in the typical
basket. Finally, the typical basket of goods doesnt account for quality differences.
Notwithstandingtheselimitations,itspopularlyusedtoprovideguidancetothelevels
of price changes in the wider economy. Unlike developed economies, inflation in
developingcountries isgenerallyhighandvariablewhichmakes them relatively less
attractive for long ?term business opportunities. Developing countries with high
inflationratescanbefoundinLACandSSA,whilecountriesofAsiahaverelativelylow


























except for theyear1994. InFigure16, inflation rates forAsiaareconsistently lower
than LAC and SSA. Thismay partly explainswhy countries in Asia attract relatively
higherlevelsofFDIinflows(inabsolutevalues).

In addition to the stability of macroeconomic indicators as means of assessing
investment opportunities, investors also weigh heavily political stability in their
locationchoices.WeusetwomeasuresofpoliticalinstabilityCoupsandRevolutions.
Thesemeasures are defined in turn: The number of  extraconstitutional or forced
changesinthetopgovernmenteliteand/oritseffectivecontrolofthenationspower
in a given year and Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any
attemptat sucha change,orany successfulorunsuccessfularmed rebellionwhose
aim is independent from the central government (Cross ?national Times ?seriesData
Archives,2003).Byinference,revolutionsarelikelytooccurcomparedtocoups,asany
attempttoremoveagovernmentelite issufficienttoconstitutearevolution,notthe











in 1995) in LAC, while Costa Rica does not have a revolution. For SSA countries
Mozambiquehas17 revolutions,while stable regimes likeMalawidonothaveone
incident. None of these revolution ?prone countries has a coup incident. Those
countries that are coups prone  Bangladesh (4), Haiti (4), Burkina Faso (4), and
Uganda (4)  have relatively fewer incidents of revolutions. This pattern, perhaps,
suggeststhataregimewhichachievespoliticalpowerthroughacoupismorelikelyto





















As displayed in Figure 17, developing countries as a group have relatively fewer
incidentsofrevolutionsfromthelate1980sandforthe1990s,beforethisperiodthe
trendsweremoreor less thesame forbothLACanddevelopingcoutries.Lookingat
each regionseparately, the incidentsof revolutions (average)are relativelyhigher in
Asiaand LAC.This conflictswith the traditionalviewwhich suggests that SSA is the
mostunstable region in thedevelopingworld.Since theearly1980s,SSAhas fewer
























Generally, thereare similar trendsof the incidentsofcoups indevelopingcountries
andLACinFigure19,albeitLAChasonaveragemoreincidentsofcoups.InFigure20,
Asiahas relatively fewer incidentsof coupsonaverageandSSAhas relativelymore
coups,theseoccuraroundthelate1970stolate1980s(thisisthelongestspellforall









into recessions, in the case of the latter, only the contraction of 1929 ?33 ismore
severe.Theseexperiencessuggestthatthestrengthoftherealeconomyisdependent
onarobustfinancialsector,onethat isabletomediate (efficiently)betweensavings
and investments with the implication of separating productive firms from their
unproductive counterparts, but also for the former to absorb the latter (something
akin tocreativedestruction).With lagginggrowth indevelopingcountries,especially
SSA and LAC and themass of distortions both in the financial sector and the real
economy,havingasoundfinancialsystemisevenmoreurgent.
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resident sectors other than government (World Development Indicators, 2006).36
This is a broad measure that captures all the accessible liquidity to firms and
consumers in the economy at any point in time. As before, this measure is

























For the fifteenyearsending1989 inFigure21,excluding theyear1981, the ratioof
liquidliabilitiestoGDPwashigherfordevelopingcountriesasagroup.Sincethenthe
ratioofbothdevelopingcountriesasagroupandLACappearstobesimilar.TheAsian
regionexperiencesasteady increase inM2/GDP, inFigure22,overLACandSSA.The
abruptspikesinbothfiguresareaccountedforbyZimbabwewhereM2/GDPreached
11048 (1976),10277 (1977),10357 (1978),4553 (1979),11608(1982),18798 (1983)
and9110(1984).Thissuggestsmonetizationoftheeconomy i.e. liquidassetsarefar
greater than the underlying productive capacity of the economy: a sure recipe for
33
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difference of real GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) at the end and
beginningofeach sub ?perioddividedby thenumberofyears.Hence the sub ?period
1975 ?1979,1980 ?84,1985 ?89,1990 ?94,and1995 ?99eachhasfourobservations,while
the sub ?period 2000 ?05 has five observations. GDP per capita is defined as gross
domesticproductdividedbymidyearpopulation.[Again]GDPisthesumofgrossvalue
addedbyallresidentproducersintheeconomyplusanyproducttaxesandminusany
subsidiesnot included in the valueof theproducts. It is calculatedwithoutmaking



















Broadly, the trends ofGDP per capita in Figure 24 are similar for both developing
countriesasagroupandLAC.However, themagnitudeofnegativeratesofGDPper
capita is larger andmorepersistent for LAC compared todeveloping countries as a















onaverageyearsof schooling in thepopulationage25yearsandolder,an indexof
three cycles of educational attainment  primary level, secondary level and post ?




educational quality or skills acquired at school (hence the measure is silent on
productivity).Inspiteoftheseshortcomings,educationalattainmentgivesafirstview
of thestockofhumancapitalavailableandwhethersocietyvalueseducation.These
































Both figures show that the educational attainment is higher for LAC compared to
developingcountriesasagroup(Figure26)andcomparedtoSSAandAsia(Figure27).
Allregionsexperienceupwardtrendsbut,LACincreasesatafasterrate.InFigure27,
toward the end of the sample, countries of Asia close the gap with LAC seen in








The aim of this chapter was to provide a detailed account of the data used in
subsequent chapters. We reach this goal by describing how each variable is
constructedandplottingtrendsforeachvariableandforthethreemajorregions(LAC,
ASIAandSSA),providingadiscussionalongtheway.Themainmessagethatemerges




the sample period, except for the financial crisis (1997 ?98). These trends are
interesting,as thewidelyheldviewwas thatAsiasgrowthcouldbeexplainedby its
relativelyhigher levelsofproductivity,partlydue tohigher levelsofhuman capital.
Evenwithinthesameregionweobservesubtledifferencesamongcountries,e.g.the
frequencywithwhichrevolutionoccursinLACandAsiaaredominatedbyMexicoand








































2001) hence FDI is through the activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs).
Research interest in FDI had its genesis in the 1950s but as Agiomirgianakis et al.
(2006)argue the complexionofFDIhaschanged.FDI is seen todayasaconduit for
technology transfer, managerial know ?how, access to foreign markets and other
growth ?inducing characteristics. This is partly reflected in what the World Bank
(1991) describes as a sea change in theway inwhich policymakers think about
development i.e. a shift away from inward oriented strategies and development
behind closed doors toward a more open door development agenda. In his
assessment of the determinants of FDI liberalisation policies in 116 developing
countries,Kobrin(2005)positsthat95percentofsuchchanges(over1992 ?2001)were
favourable toward FDI. In the period 2002 ?04 an (annual) average of 85 countries
effected policy changes (affecting FDI), 91% of which provided incentives to FDI
(UNCTAD,2005).Butdoesthisliberaldevelopmentorientationincreasetheinflowsof
FDIbeyondwhatwouldhavebeenobtained in itsabsence,ordoes it justmotivate





Africa (SSA) are afflicted by low saving and virtually shut ?out of the international
capitalmarket.PolicymakersinthedevelopingworldseemtobelievethatFDIoffersa
sourceofforeigncapitalinflowthatsupportstheaimofachievinggrowth,reflectedin




(partially irreversible).Thefocusofthischapter istothrowsome lightonthefactors
determininginflowsofFDIinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC),tosystematically
investigate anydifferential effectsbetween factors affecting FDI inflows in LAC and
otherregionsofdevelopingcountries.

Our approach in spirit follows Asiedu (2002),who studies the determinants of FDI
inflows in SSA countries and considers the question ofwhether Africa is different




measureof liquid liabilities,GDPgrowthandanAfricandummy).Themajor findings




By includingotherpotentialdeterminants (economicand institutional),a richerand
more complete understanding of FDI inflows in LAC andwhether they differ from
otherdevelopingcountriescanbeprovided.Inspirittheapproachfollowedisthatof
QuarteyandTsikata(2007)andTrevinoandMixon(2004)whoassessawiderangeof




inLAC.Section3 looksatpreviousempirical researchonFDI flows.Section4briefly
discussesdataandvariablesused inthechapter.Section5furtherexploresthedata












Until the early 1980s Latin American countries were largely closed to the world
economy,with relatively protectionist trade regimes and restrictions on FDI. Since
then these countrieshaveopenedup,partlydue to the failed inwarddevelopment
strategy and the debt crisis and more importantly the forces of globalization.




economies on FDI has important implications for development in the region. The
welcomepracticethatLACcountrieshavereplacedmilitaryrulewithdifferentvariants
of democracy underliemuch optimism for FDI inflows. In 1979 over two ?thirds of
LatinAmericaspeoplewerelivingundermilitaryrule.By1993,however,notasingle
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$315 billion (World Development Report, 1998). The inflows of FDI to developing
countries increasedfrom$24billion in1990to$178billion in2000,24%and61%of
aggregate foreign investment inflows respectively (Asiedu, 2002). FDI flows have
becomeoneofthemostdynamic featuresofthemodernglobaleconomy (Dunning,
2002). Again this is encouraging in light of the experience that many developing
countrieshave limited access to international capitalmarkets and low saving rates,
especially those of SSA and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The aggregate
picture, however,masks the fact that there is regional concentration of inflows to
developing countries.Notwithstanding campaigns to lure FDI,Africaand LAChardly





developingworldasawhole for theperiodunder investigation.Theaverage return
(13.8%) to US FDI over 1991 ?96 in Latin America and the Caribbean is the lowest
amongdevelopingcountries(Asiedu,2002).

Recent evidence suggests thatdeveloping countries accounted for36% (over2003 ?
2005)oftotal inflows,AsiaandOceaniareceived21%ofthisamount, inflowstoLAC
was 12% and 3%was reported for Africa (UNCTAD, 2006). Inflows have, however,
increased in 2004 and 2005, by 44% and 3% respectively for LAC. This has been
attributed to good growth performance, increased commodity prices (resulting in
current account surplus) and a general improvement in the investment climate
(UNCTAD,2006;2005).AfricareceivedanincreaseinFDI($36billion)in2005despitea
reduction in the shareof global inflows,while FDI for LAC remains flat ($70billion,
excluding income from offshore financial centres that earn $14 billion) over 2005.
InflowstoAsiaandOceaniareachrecordlevels($260billion)in2006(UNCTAD,2007).
Noorbakhshetal. (2001)assert that sinceFDI inEastandSouthEastAsiaovertook
thatinLACin1988thegaphaswidened.Thisraisestheempiricalquestionofwhether















gross fixed capital formation (Cravino et al., 2007). Offshore financial centres are

















Netherlands, France, Canada, and UK (UNCTAD, 2004). With many EU investors
concentratingonhomemarket, flows fromEUcountriesare lessstable than theUS.
Thispartlyexplainsthereversaloftheboominthe1990sandthedownturninrecent











Inflows of FDI to LAC are evident in primary, manufacture and services sectors.
Primary (oil, gas andother rawmaterials) andmanufacture (especially cement and
steel) sectors include exportables,whereas themain services (utilities, finance and
telecommunications) are typically not exported. For the period 1996 ?2003, services
havebeenthemostattractivesectortoforeigninvestors;FDIinflowsinserviceswere
59 percent of regional flows,manufacturewas 28 percent and the primary sector
registered13percent (althoughflowstothemanufacturesectorgrewfasterthanto
services). The strength of the manufacture sector continues in 2005 and 2006,
accountingfor41percentofregionalflows.Attheheightoftheliberalizationepisode
of the 1990smost of the inflowswent into services (UNCTAD, 2007, 2006; ECLAC,
2004).

This aggregate analysis obscures the fact that sector distribution of inflows is not
uniform across countries of LAC. Figures 3 ?5 show a clear and unambiguous




Spain.Therewerenegative inflows inservices forArgentina in2002. Incontrast,the


















































The strategicproximityof LAC to the largesteconomy (theUS) in theworldand its
relativestability intermofpoliticalrisksmake itanattractivemarketforFDI inflows.
Thisopportunitywasseizeduponbyforeigninvestorsduringtheboomdecadeofthe
1990s.TheChinaeffect(andconcentrationofEUinvestorsonhomemarket)seems
to have had an impact on this trend,with policymakers expressing fear of inflows
diverting to China. The fear of PRC [People Republic of China] is floating in the
atmosphere here. It has become a challenge to the Americas not only because of
cheaplabor,butalsoontheskilledlabor,technologicalandforeigninvestmentfronts
(CesarGavin,OrganizationofAmerican States; cited inChantasasawat etal.,2004).
Studies have attempted to investigate the effects of Chinas role on LAC ability to
attract FDI. Theyobserve that theemergenceofChina as an attractive FDI location
diverts FDI flows from LAC (Chantasasawat etal.,2004). In contrast,Garcia ?Herrero
(2005)positsthattheemergenceofChinahasonlyanegligiblediversioneffectonFDI
flows from LAC, mostly for Mexico and Colombia before 2001 and after 2000










Chinas influence to reduce FDI flows in LAC.A similar theme has been echoed by
GalanandGonzalez ?Benito(2006)indistinguishingcircumstancesunderwhichSpanish
firmsselectLACastheirpreferred location.TheyassertthatthedecisionforSpanish
firms to invest in LAC is based on features unique to the region, for example the
cultural similarity,and idiosyncratic features thatareunique toaparticular country
e.g. consumers preferences, and trade unions attitudes in resolving industrial
disputes,etc.

Following the reform process in LAC, Trevino et al. (2002) argue that privatization
exertsastronginfluenceonFDIinflowsandthisadvantageissustainedlongafterthe
process is complete. The implication is that potential investorswill perceive a host
government as investor ?friendly and be willing to invest there. This has been
supportedbyShatz (2001)whomaintains thatpartof the reasonswhy theAndean
group(Bolivia,Colombia,Ecuador,Peru,andVenezuela)wasabletoexperiencearise
intheratioofFDI/GDP(from1994 ?1998)wasduetoslackeningofpoliciestowardFDI
during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of the hostility toward FDI was among LAC
economists inthe1950sand1960sduringthecore ?peripherydebatewhichargues




freedom (the degree of openness, government intervention, distortion in the
economy, and corruption) and inflation are themost robust factors that affect FDI
flows. InanalyzingtheeffectsofFDIongrowth,theyfindthatoneway inwhichLAC
canexpand theireconomies, in linewith the receivedwisdom, is throughattracting
moreFDIflows.Estimatingagrowthregressionto identifydeterminantsofgrowth in
LAC, De Gregorio (1992) presents evidence that foreign investments increase the
potentialforgrowthandthemarginalcontributionisgreaterrelativetoothertypesof
investments.Thisisnotsurprising,giventhecompetitivenatureofforeigninvestments
and their international experience. Beyond providing capital, however, foreign
47
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investments are not homogeneous in their growth potential; Alfaro and Charlton




effects of the reform process on FDI inflows. Contrary to the cheerleaders of the
reformprocess,theypostulatethatoftheraftofeconomicreformsundertakeninthe
region,onlydomestic financial liberalizationand tradeencourageFDI flowsand that
the benefits of international capital liberalization and privatization have been
exaggerated, as the evidence in support of these factors is lacking. In terms of
institutionalreforms,theyarguethatreducingtheriskofexpropriationiscriticalgiven
the notoriety of nationalization in the region. The correct lesson that follows is for
policymakerstoavoidthe(WashingtonConsensusstyle)completepackageofreform,
butrathertotargetthosethatspecificallysatisfythepreferences(andisbeneficialtoa




Beingcontiguous to theUSmarketmaynotbe theonlyadvantage for theMexican
economy in attracting FDI inflows. Love and Lage ?Hidalgo (2000) find that location
characteristics,particularlyfactor(wagerate,andthishasinfluencebothintheshort
and long run) cost differentials between the US and Mexico and the market
hypotheses encourage investors from the US. Since the marginal productivity of
labour increases as a result of FDI (through new ideas such as more efficient
production techniques), they share concerns that increased FDI in response to this
favourable wage differentials may put upward pressure on wages, both in the
maquiladora industrywhere there is a high concentration of US FDI and in other
sectors of the economy (thus increasing equilibriumwages), thereby driving FDI to
morecompetitive locations.Aitkenetal. (1996) findnoevidenceofwage spillovers
from higher paid foreign investors to wages paid by domestic firms in Mexico or
Venezuela. This they suggestmay be because foreign investors and domestic firms







The literature is replete with empirical analyses of factors affecting FDI flows. In
additiontothestudiescitedabove,thereareotherstudieswhichseektoshedlighton
whysomecountriesaremoresuccessful inattractingFDI,ormoregenerallywhyFDI
favours certain locations relative toothers.Mostof these studies focuson location
factors and ignore firm ?specific advantages (for example proprietary advantage) as
such analysis requiresmicrodata,while analysison locationdeterminants relieson
country aggregate data (Cardoso de Mendonca and Nonnemberg, 2002).
Unfortunately,givenLACpastexperienceofpolicyexclusionandtheimportantroleof
FDI to development, notmuch research has been done on FDI inflows in LAC, the
potentialdifferencesversusotherregionsand the impacton the levelsofFDI flows.
Thereareafewexceptions.

EmmertandTuman (1999) lookat thedeterminantsof JapaneseFDI inflows for12
(largest)LACcountries.Thepanel is1972 ?92andtheydichotomizethedeterminants
intoeconomic(marketpotential,trade,work ?forcesize,costofproduction,economic
adjustment policies) and political (foreign aid and political instability) variables.
Japanese FDI inflows in LAC are influenced by market size (population), political
instabilitydue to revolutionarymovements,deathsandadjustmentepisodesarising
from structural adjustment programmes. Traditional measures of labour quality






In this connection, they attempt to assess the dominance of institutional over
economicfactors.First,apooledOLSregressionrevealsthatexchangerate instability
discourages FDI whereas GDP, privatization, and somewhat surprisingly, capital
controls and inflation all serve as attractors. Amore efficient estimation technique
(fixedeffects)suggeststhatGDPhasapositiveinfluence,butinflationandprivatization
are insignificant.Politicalrisk ispositiveandhighlysignificant inbothversionsofthe
model,anindicationthattheriskadjustedrateofreturnonFDIinflowsinLACishigh
(this contrasts with Emmert and Tuman, 1999). The final step in their estimation
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procedure (as to whether institutions dominate economic factors) throws up
institutionalinfluenceasmostdominantinattractingFDIinflowsinLAC.

In a rather different approach, Woodward and Rolfe (1992) use a discrete choice
technique, utilizing a conditional logit model with micro level data to find the
influenceson thechoiceofcountry forexport ?orientedFDI inflows in theCaribbean
Basinarea (asampleofparticularlysmall islandstates).Thevariablestheyutilizeare
assumed to feature prominently in the probability of which country to invest. In





Using a longitudinal methodology over 1975 ?00, Cardoso de Mendonca and
Nonnemberg(2002) investigatethedeterminantsofFDIflowsfor38developing(and
transition) economies. Their evidence suggests that market size, previous growth
performance, education and openness are important in FDI location. Ameasure of
capitalmarketgrowth (fromDowJones) inthesourcecountrysupportsFDIoutflows
and risk is significant (asmeasured by inflation). These results are confirmedwhen
fixedeffectsaretakenintoaccount.

TheMiddle East andNorthAfrica (MENA) regions pattern of FDI inflows has been
studiedbyOnyiewu(2003).Thisregionisrichinnaturalresources ?oil ?thereforeone
wouldexpectresource ?seekingFDItofavourtheMENAregion.However,abinary(0,
1) variable (indicating the volume of FDI inflows) suggests that FDI inflows to this
regioncompared todevelopingcountriesmightbe lower.Onyiewu (2003) finds that
theMENAregion isdifferent,asthereducedFDI inflowsareaffectedbygovernment
bureaucracy and corruption and trade restrictions. Economic fundamentals,
infrastructureand the levelof returnon investmentaresignificant for increasedFDI
inflowsinnon ?MENAregions.

TheopeningofEasternEuropean centrallyplannedeconomies in the1990sprovide





addresses the question of the differential effects of FDI inflows in CIS
(e.g.Turkmenistan Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia) and Central and Eastern
European and Baltic (CEEB) countries. They employ two different estimation
techniques  fixed effects and GMM. The primary aim of the GMM is to provide
suitable instruments (and to knock out endogeneity effects) to assess the role of
previous (agglomeration effect) FDI stock. They conclude that previous FDI, a large
market,minimumlabourcost,abundanceofnaturalresources,externalliberalization,
fewerrestrictionsonFDIandcountrieswithgoodinstitutionsstandtobenefitfromFDI
inflows. Theydivide the sample intoCISandnon ?CIS countries to identifypotential
differencesinFDIflows.TheyfindthatFDIflowsareattractedtonaturalresourcerich
CIScountriesviagood infrastructureandabundanceofnaturalresource. Incontrast,
good institutionsand theaccumulated stockofFDIaccount forFDI flows innon ?CIS
countries.

Cheng and Kwan (2000) model the agglomeration effect (and other variables) on
regional FDI distribution across Chinas provinces from 1985 ?95. Like Campos and
Kinoshita (2003) they useGMM in search of appropriate instruments and find that
previousFDIisamajordeterminantoffutureinflows.Allthetraditionaldeterminants
turnoutasexpected,except foreducationwhich is insignificant. Importantly,policy
variableslikespecialeconomicareasseemtoaffecttheregionallocationofFDIinflows
inChina. InanearlierstudybySunetal. (1999)aboutFDI inflowsacrossChinas30
provinces, for a relatively short period (1989 ?96), the herding effect of attracting
futureFDI inflowsdue topast inflows servesasadeterrent.Highly skilledworkers
and good research capability are good signals for FDI inflows. Contrary to





MarketProgramme (SMP)even increased intra ?EUFDI.Agiomirgianakisetal. (2006)
examinethefactorsthatsupportFDIinflowsinOECDcountries,usingpanelestimation

















































































































































































Thepaneldatasetused for this chapter spans theperiod1975 ?2005 inclusive,ona
sample of 68 developing countries, 20 in LAC, 13 from Asia, 31 from sub ?Saharan




are excluded. Information onmost variables is based on published data from the
World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006). The governance variables are
takenfromthePolityIVProject(2004),andthepoliticalinstabilityvariablesarethose
from the Cross ?national Time Series Data Archive (2003). In addition to being
authoritativesources,thesedatasetsarereadilyaccessible.WeusetheratioofFDIto





capital repatriation. Following Aseidu (2002) and Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006) and
othersweusetheratiooftradeflows(importsandexportsofgoodsandservices)to
GDPtoproxytradeopenness(OPEN).Anopentraderegime isan indicationof lower
transactionandinformationcostsandlesswillingnessonthepartofpolicymakersfor
rentseekingbehaviour.Thiswillfacilitatelearningspillovers,aslocallybasedfirmswill






the business space unattractive to FDI. All these costs of government failures are
transferredtoinvestorsmakingthecostofbusinessesmoreonerous(Onyeiwu,2003;
Quartey and Tsikata 2007). Firmswill locate in countries that have an open trade
regime, sowe expect a positive relationshipwith FDI flows.A negative coefficient,






the cost of doing business (and increases productivity), while poor quality
infrastructurehas the reverseeffect. Investors, therefore,prefergood infrastructure
(MoodyandWheeler,1992),andhostcountries stand tobenefitas it improves the
location attractiveness for FDI inflows (Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006). We use the
number of telephone lines per 1000 population to proxy infrastructure (INFRAS)
(Asiedu, 2002;Campos and Kinoshita, 2003,Morisset, 2000;Assanie and Singleton,
2001).Themotivationunderlyingthisproxy isthatcountrieswith largenumberof
telephone lines are more likely to have better roads, modern airport/seaports,
Internet access, and water/electricity supply (Onyeiwu, 2003: 06). Thus, good
infrastructure stands to benefit both market serving and export ?oriented FDI.
Availability of good infrastructure is important but reliability is even more crucial
(Aseidu,2002).ApositiverelationshipwithFDIisexpected.

There isaconsensus inthe literaturethatGDPgrowthexertsapositive influenceon
FDI inflows. Following Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006), Quartey and Tsikata (2006),
Asiedu(2002)andOnyeiwu(2003)weuseGDPgrowth(annual%)tomeasuremarket
size (GDPGR).A largemarketallows for thepossibilityof scaleeconomiesandgood
economic performance (Morisset, 2000). The level of economic growth may also
indicatethegeneral levelofdevelopment inthehostcountry(RolfeandWoodward,





investors that proper infrastructure to facilitate profitability is absent, because
governmentsresourcesareconsumedbydebtrepayments.Ahighlyindebtedstateis
alsoaccompaniedbyahighlytaxedregimeand,sincepolicymakerswillhavetofind






ratioof totaldebtservice to thesumofexportsofgoods,servicesand incomeasa
measurefordebtburden(DEBTSG).

Oneof theprincipalaimsofFDI inflows is tosearch forprofitable locations.Holding
manyotherthingsequal,FDIwillgowherethepotentialforreturnoninvestmentsis
thehighestafteradjustingforpossiblerisks(Onyeiwu,2003).Thisispossiblethrougha





that suppresshuman rights (featureofauthoritarian rule),asprofitsarehigherand
propertyrightsaresecured.Fortheirgovernancemeasure,theyuseFreedomHouse
index of political rights and civil liberties. In hiswork on the relationship between




As not all aspects of democratic institutionsmight be important in explaining FDI
inflows,weuseconstraintsontheexecutive(XCONST)toproxygoodgovernancefrom
thePolity IVProject (2004).Perssonetal. (1997)argue thatchecksandbalanceson
theexecutivearelikelytodisciplineotherwisecorruptpoliticiansbentontheabuseof
power. Investors would be expected to be attracted to countries that have low
probabilities of policy reversal, as indicated by good governance structures (i.e.
appropriatechecksandbalances),aftertheyhavesunktheirinvestments.Apriori,we
expect a positive relationship between XCONST39and FDI inflows. This variable is
basedonascaleof1 ?7:higherscore indicatesmoreconstraints(bettergovernance).
Twomeasuresofpolitical instability areused: the numberof revolutions (REVOLU)
and assassinations (ASSAS) in a country (Asiedu, 2006; Emmert and Tuman, 1999,










stablemacroeconomic environment is a record of price stability. A history of low
inflationandprudent fiscalactivity signals to investorshowcommittedandcredible
thegovernment is (CamposandKinoshita,2003:10) considering thatoneof the





line with previous studies, we use the annual change in consumer prices to
approximateinflation(INFLA)(Aseidu,2002;CamposandKinoshita,2003;Emmertand



















variability, partly because of the extremely high maximum (for the Democratic
RepublicofCongoovertheperiod1990 ?94).Figures6 ?10providescatterplotsofFDI
inflowsagainstselectedvariablesofthepaneldataused intheeconometricanalysis.





determinedbyoutlyingvalues).ThesameappliestoGDPGRand INFRAS, i.e.there is
sufficient dispersionofobservations to support a broadlypositive relationshipwith
FDI.TherelationshipinFigure9isveryweak,onlypartlybecauseXCONSTisbunched
on certain values. Figure 10 indicates a negative relationship between FDI and
DEBTSG,althoughthisisprobablydrivenbycountrieswithrelativelylowormoderate
values (i.e. thepatternbelowDEBSTGof40%).Theseareallpotential influenceson
FDI inflows, but none are obviously driving determinants, i.e. there is considerable
noise intherelationship.Somevariablesmaybemore importantforsomecountries,







































































































yit = ȕȜit + Ȟit                   (1)             

wherethecompositeerror isȞit  =  Įi + İitand i,trepresentcountriesandtimeperiods
respectively.Įi isunique toeachunit (country), İit is idiosyncraticdisturbances,yitis
thedependentvariableandȜit isthevectorofexplanatoryvariables(explainedabove).
We includeĮitocontrolforunobserved(country level)effectsacrosscountries i.e.to
account for country heterogeneity in our sample. There is another important issue
withthisspecification:iftheunobservedcountry ?leveleffectsarecorrelatedwiththe
vector of explanatory variables, then fixed effects is the appropriate estimation







FDI/GDPit=Įi+ȕ0OPENit+ȕ1INFRASit+ȕ2GDPGRit+ȕ3REVOLUit+                    (2)                                  






and random year ?on ?year volatility. The analysis is then extended to address






































were tried,but theywere insignificant.Allspecifications includeaconstant term.Argentina









and confirms previous findings.With FE estimates, INFLA and DEBTSG also appear




AlthoughFE isthepreferredmodel, itonlyaccounts forunobservedcountry ?specific
factors;therestillremainsthepotentialofendogeneity.Thisarisesifaregressorina
modelthatisexpectedtodeterminethedependentvariableisinturndeterminedby
the dependent variable, or if both variables are determined by a third unobserved
variable. For example, FDI may be attracted to countries with good growth
performance, but if growth is to be included as a determinant of FDI inflows it is
importanttocontrolforpotentialendogeneityarisingbecauseFDImayitselfhavean
impactongrowthorthere isanunobservedfactorthataffectsbothFDIandgrowth.






using the first difference generalized method of moments (GMM), with lagged
regressorsas instruments,due toArellanoandBond (1991).NdikumanaandVerick
(2007)addressendogeneitywiththeuseoflagged(oneperiod)explanatoryvariables.
Lensink and Morrissey (2006) use both 2SLS estimator and lagged explanatory
variablestoaddresspotentialendogeneitybetweenFDI(andFDIvolatility)andgrowth
and find that lagged explanatory variablesperformbetter (because, as isoften the
case,itisdifficulttofindsuitableinstruments).

Table 5 reports results using both lagged explanatory variables and first difference
GMM to control for potential endogeneity. In addition to providing valid internal
instruments, the first differenceGMM purges the data of any country level effects
(CameronandTrivedi,2006).Thevalidityoftheinstrumentscanbeassessedthrough
the Hansen/Sargan test of over ?identifying restrictions (OIR) with a chi ?square
distribution under the null that the over ?identifying restrictions are valid and no
secondorder serial correlation (distributedN(0,1)) in the residualsof thedifference







ToimplementthefirstdifferenceGMM,wetakefirstdifferencesof(1)togiveyit  yit-1 
= ȕ(Ȝit -  Ȝit-1) + (Įi - Įit-1) + (İit - İit-1).Thiseliminates country level fixedeffects togive
the difference equation, ǻyit = ȕǻȜit + ǻİitwhere Įi - Įit-1 = 0 and for t = 2T. This
transformationresolvestheomittedvariable issuebut introducesendogeneity,since
Ȝit-1 is endogeneous to the error disturbances through İit -1 (Nkurunziza and Bates,
2003).The lattercanbeaddressedbyusingsuitable instruments (lag levels) forǻȜit-1 





























































GMM is lagged2/3periods,withallexplanatoryvariablesas theirown instruments.PooledOLSand
GMMuserobuststandarderrors.GMMusestimedummies(y2,y3,y4,y5andy6).Theautocorrelation














For the first difference GMMmodel DEBTSG, INFLA, INFRAS (weakly), GPDGR and
XCONST are significant and all except XCONST have the expected sign; OPEN is





Insofar as the lags are valid instruments and the GMM controls for unobserved
country ?specific factors it gives relatively efficient estimates and is therefore the









attracted by natural resources or privatization may be less concerned about
governance thanmarket ?seeking FDI or investment formanufactured exports. It is
possiblethat insomedevelopingcountrieswith lowvaluesforpositivedeterminants
of FDI (growth, infrastructure and macroeconomic stability) but that have other




stability) explain much of the cross ?country variation in FDI inflows, in particular
investmentformanufactures(market ?seekingorexport ?oriented);countrieswithhigh
valuesofthesevariablesmayalsotendtohaverelativelyhighXCONST.Otherfeatures
thatareattractive toFDI,suchasnatural resourcesor large ?scaleprivatization,may













variable inflationmake future profits uncertain, thus foreign investors are likely to
considerthesepossibilitiesintheirlocationchoices.Thisissupportedbymanystudies,
butcontradictsotherswhoplausiblyarguethatthewillingnessofforeigninvestorsto
invest inhighly indebted andhigh inflationdeveloping countries isdue to thehigh
rates of return after adjusting for these distortions. The high rates of return on























40Analternative interpretation insupportof this finding in thecontextofChina is thateven thoughproperty rights
were not legally recognized in themid ?1990s, investors felt secure about their investments in China compared to















































developing countries. GMM is our preferred method. In general, LAC and other
developing countries share the samecharacteristics inattractingFDI inflows,except
that infrastructure ispositivelyrelated toFDI inLACrelative todevelopingcountries
generally.This finding isnot surprising,asmostFDI inLAC ismarket serving. In the
case of Africa, most FDI is resource ?seeking hence good seaports may be more
Notes: LAC is a (1, 0) dummy for Latin America and the Caribbean.We have used only those





important.Does thismean that LAC is different? XCONST discourages FDI flows in
developingcountries,consistentwithearlierfinding.Goodinfrastructureiscrucialfor
market ?servingFDItomaximizescaleeconomieswithinahostcountry,whileexport ?
oriented FDI serving internationalmarketsmusthave current information to satisfy
consumersdemand. 

Itmay be argued that results in Table 6 are driven by a group of countrieswhich
received relativelymore FDI inflows relative to LAC and SSA.CountriesofEastAsia
attracthigher levelsofFDI inflows;weassesstheir influence,andwhetherthismight
affect the overall results, by interacting an Asian (ASIA) dummywith all significant





































































In assessing the regional effects ofAsia, infrastructure quality does not attract FDI








1980s,whileAsia isselective intheirFDIregime,apracticethat isabsent inLACand
maynotbe to the regionsadvantage (AgosinandMachado,2007).Taken together,
results inTable6 suggesting that LACmaybedifferentarenot influencedby those
countriesthatattractrelativelymoreFDIinflows.Astrongercasecanbemade,about
differences between LAC and other regions, by splitting the sample into two sub ?
samplesLACandnon ?LAC.

Thus,we construct two sub ?samples of 20 (LAC) and 48 (non ?LAC) countries. This
providestheopportunitytodigdeeperandbringtothesurfaceanydifferencesthat
may exist. The size of these sub ?samples renders the use of first differenceGMM
estimator infeasible: The GMM estimators are asymptotically biased in a small
sample(CamposandKinoshita,2003).Asbefore,weemployrandomeffectsandfixed
effectswith potential endogenous variables (OPEN andGDPGR) lagged one period.















































Notes: P ?value in parentheses.  *** Significance at the 0.01 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.  All
specificationsarebasedonthepaneldataforthesixsub ?periods.Estimatesareforthe20LACand48non ?
LACcountries.Allregressionsincludedaconstantterm.TheHausmantestwithp ?value.01andʖ219.52is




































Notes: P ?value in parentheses.  *** Significance at the 0.01 level, **
significanceat the0.05 level.All regressionshavea constant term.Only
significantvariablesfromTable8arere ?estimated.

Table9 supportsdifferencesbetween LACandnon ?LAC reported inTables6and8,
exceptXCONST isnow insignificant fornon ?LAC.Thesedifferencesarehighlighted in








Ƣj = (ǅj /ǅy)Ǒj    where   j = 1, , k  

Ƣj is the beta coefficient of the jth regressor, ǅj is the standard deviation for the
estimatedcoefficientofthejthregressor,ǅyisthestandarddeviationoftheestimated
coefficient for thedependent variable andǑjis theestimated coefficientof the jth
regressor.Because itmakesthescaleoftheregressors irrelevant,thisequationputs













Notes: All variables are taken from Table 9. The beta




deviation increases in infrastructurequality increasesFDI inflowstoLAC.44standard
deviation.A1standarddeviationincreasesininflationreducesFDIinflowstoLAC.19





Because FDI inflows bring perceived advantages, policy makers in the developing
world have accepted an accommodating stance, competing to attract FDI. In this
chapterwe setout to investigatewhetherLACwasdifferent fromotherdeveloping






aresimilar in termsof the roleofcertaincore features inattractingFDI inflows, for
example an open trade regime. Furthermore, we have found evidence that
macroeconomic instability (high inflation) discourages FDI to LAC and high debt
reduces FDI tonon ?LAC.However, these findings arenot robust todifferentmodel
specifications.Additionally, LAC receives lessFDI compared todeveloping countries,
by on average 2.2 percentage (ofGDP) points.Ourmain result suggests that good
infrastructurequality attracts FDI to LAC,butdoesnot appear tohave a significant











an advantage over other developing countries in attracting FDI by focusing on
improving the infrastructurequalityof the region.Becauseexportsare important to
the regions economic success in generating urgent foreign exchange, beyond the
provision of telephone lines, LAC should incorporate seaports and airports
infrastructuredevelopment in theiroverall infrastructure goals inorder to take full













































































































































































Notes: P ?value in parentheses. *** Significance at the 0.01 level, **
significant at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level. These
estimates are basedon robust standard error. These results are not
efficient compared to fixed and random effects, for e.g. they dont

















Notes: Privatization as define here is at least 50% ownership by the private
sector. The largest privatization occurred in Brazilwhen the government sold
Telebras for $19 billion. Telebras consisted of three fixed ?line companies,
one longdistanceand internationalcompany,andeightcellularholdings.Using
















































Policymakers in thedevelopingworld anddevelopment agencies alikebelieve that
foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)isgrowthenhancing,assuggestedbytheirpolicystance













how to generate growth in the presence of FDI. The representative papers in this
regard are Lensink andMorrissey (2006), Alfaro et al. (2004), Hermes and Lensink
(2003),andBorenszteinetal.(1998).Theyallsupportthenotionthattheremightnot
be an automatic relationship between FDI and growth while trying to identify
conditionsunderwhichFDI isgrowthenhancing.Theaimof this chapter isadirect
analysisoftheeffectsofFDIoneconomicgrowth inapanelofdevelopingcountries,
providingevidencethatthereisadirectrelationship(contrarytothecurrentliterature












FDI, knowingwhere the constraints lie is critical to assist national governments in
selectingpolicieswhichdonothaveperverseeffects.44Tothisend,thechapterapplies
appropriate econometric techniques to analyze the impact of FDI on growth,
accountingforotherdeterminantsofgrowth.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the theoretical
literature. Section 3 discusses previous empirical studies. Section 4 outlines the






At a conceptual level FDIhas a first ?order effectof increasing the stockof physical
capitalinahosteconomyandsecond ?ordereffectsofstimulatinglearningandhuman
capitaldevelopmentthuspromotingtechnologicalupgrading(deMello,1999). Inthe
naïve framework of the neo ?classical Solow45growth model foreign investment is
predicted to improve long ?rungrowth through technologicalprogress (anexogenous
factor). Technology is the driver of economic growth (Romer, 2001) and FDI can
provide technology (and the managerial skills to use it). 46It is well established
(according to the lawofdiminishing returns) that themarginalproductof capital is
higher in capital ?scarcecountries, so (with freemobilityof factors) thedisembodied
technical knowledge that accompanies FDI should flow from developed to





















returns can result innon ?convergence ofper capita incomebetween rich andpoor
countries,withslower(oreventheabsenceof)growthinthelatter.Inafullyspecified
competitive equilibrium one can achieve persistent output growth per capita over
time.48Increasesincapitalstock(knowledge)inthetechnologyleaderwillresultinthe









In the familiar two ?factor two ?commodity 49 model of international trade, under
constantreturnstoscale,BrecherandDiazAlejandro(1977)showthattariff ?induced
capital inflows to a host economy can reducewelfare through lower consumption
patternsandhence FDImaybe immiserizing (deMello,1999:135).Thismayoccur
through at least two channels  the traditional tariff ?induced distortions in
consumption and production and if capital is paid its full marginal product and
investors are allowed to repatriate profits through exportables, Brecher and Diaz
Alejandro (1977) illustrate that capital inflows work to reduce the host countrys
welfare.Theupshotof this theoretical frameworkemphasizes that starting froman













thewelfareofadevelopingeconomydependonwhether it is investment ?orsaving ?
constraints.Fora saving ?constrainedeconomy theydemonstrate thata reduction in
domestic interestrates(foraneconomythat initiallyhashigh interestratesandnow










A furtherpointworthemphasising,according to theseauthors capital inflowsmake
thehostcountrycurrencylesscompetitiverelativetoitstradingpartners.Theoverall
effectoninvestmentsislessclearinthatthenon ?tradablesectorseesappreciationas
good,while forexports this is clearlya constraint.But, since tradablesholdgreater
potential forenhancingdeveloping countrieseconomicperformance,depreciation is
goodforinvestmentandgrowth.Rodrik(2007)providesboththeoreticalandempirical
supporttothisendandthisisparticularlytruefordevelopingcountriesinhispanelof
184 countries. He thus concludes, Tradable economic activities are special in
developing countries [and] real exchange rate depreciation increases the relative
profitabilityofinvestingintradables,andactsasasecond ?bestfashiontoalleviatethe
economiccostsofthisdistortion(Rodrik,2007:32).ThisissupportedbyJohnsonetal.
(2007) in that part of the reasons for African countries inability to improve their













endogenous growth model. There are no barriers to entry thus foreign firms are
allowedtocompetewithlocalfirmsinthedomesticmarketondifferentiatedvarieties.
Each firm is integrated forward in two steps,which allows for research activities to
drivenewproductvarieties in intermediategoods.Withonly two inputs in research
activities(humancapitalandexistingstockofknowledge),theyshowthattechnology
intensiveforeign ?fundedfirmsaregoodforgrowthbyintroducingagreaternumberof
new intermediate varieties.Themodel alsounderscores gains that canbeobtained











the notion of convergence, countries that produce fewer initial varieties of capital
goods tend togrow faster,as thecostof technologicaladoption is lower relative to





Wang (1990) models FDI and growth as dynamic in nature which encapsulates
interactions of capital accumulation, technology change, and international capital
movements.Hesuggests thatmoving fromastateofautarky tocapitalmobility the
rateofchangeofhumancapitalwillincrease,asthiswillnowdependonflowsofFDI
with the potential of diffusing technology with growth ?enhancing effects in the
recipientcountry.Duringthetransitionphasethisispossibleprovidedthegrowthrate








rich countries Thebooming innovationdrive in the rich countrymayholdback the
capitalthatwouldotherwiseflowtothelessdevelopedcountry(Wang,1990:267).In
thismodelincreasesindomesticsavingreducesgrowthbecauseitslowstheimpactof





between growth and FDI; instead economic integration simultaneously determines
bothgrowthandFDIflows.Theemphasishereisthecore ?peripheryoutcomeofFDI
andgrowthasa resultofeconomic integration. If the tradecostsbetweenpotential
trading nations are high, this heightens the profitability of domestic firms in the
periphery (due toprotectionistpolicies),but as theybegin to fall this increases the
advantages of foreign ?invested firms (due to their research activities); this have
welfareimplications:ashiftofmanufacturingtotheperipheryincreaseswagesthere,
whilewages inthecorefall.Thisreductionofwages inthecoretranslates intolower
costR&Dactivities,whichinturnleadtofasterproductdevelopment;labourdemand
increasesinR&Dactivitiesinthecoreasaresult,eventhoughmanufacturingactivities




Alfaroetal. (2007)model the local ?conditionhypothesisby incorporatingtheroleof
financialdevelopment inanalysing thegrowtheffectsofFDI.Theyobserve that ina
welldevelopedfinancialenvironment,FDIimprovesgrowththroughbackwardlinkages
withdomestic firms.This isparticularly truewhen goodsproducedby foreign firms
and theirdomestic counterpartsareperfect complements. Further, theyassert that
withimperfectcreditmarketspotentialinvestorswillfacehighborrowingcosts;thisis
exacerbatedwith anunderdeveloped financial system.Any increase in the shareor
productivityofforeignfirms(intotaloutput)willreallocateresourcesawayfromlocal






destructionofdomestic firms in the short run,however, surviving firmswillbenefit
fromgreaterFDIproductivityduetospilloversandthepresenceofFDIwhichservesto
strengthen the financial environment thus making resources available to surviving
firms.Inaddition,throughbackwardlinkagesfromthefinalgoodstotheintermediate
sector, thiswill increase theoverallgrowth rateof theeconomy.They confront the




This linkages argument is analysedby Lin and Saggi (2007) in a two ?tieroligopoly
structure. In particular, ifmultinationals as final goods producers enter a recipient
country through contractual arrangements with local intermediate producers by




intermediate output (i.e. greater profit for suppliers) and strengthens backward




is createdwhen the intermediate sector is large and the effects of the technology
transferoff ?setthosefirmsthataresqueezedoutbytheentryofmultinationals.

Similarly, in Markusen and Venables (1999) multi ?industry (final and intermediate)
modelentryofmultinationalsinthefinaloutputindustryaffectsthehosteconomyon
two fronts  competition effect and linkage effect. In this model the entry of











of development in the sense of taking account of shared cultural and historical
experiences. This is implied in Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) insofar as intense
competition from domestic firms may propel foreign investors to invest in more
advancetechnology.Rodriguez ?Clare(1996)alsoshowsthatwhenlinkagesarestrong
FDI is likely to improve the welfare of underdeveloped countries. These positive
linkagesaredeterminedbyhigh trade costsbetweenhostandhome countries, the
intensity of intermediate inputs (require by the foreign firm) and the
complementaritiesbetweenthem.

One would expect domestic savings to stimulate growth through higher private
investments. This is intuitively appealing because it makes monetary resources
available for production purposes. This supposition, however, is not indisputable. If
monitoringby lenders is incomplete,thismoralhazardmayprovideopportunitiesfor
borrowerstoengageinunproductiveactivities.Aghionetal.(2006)modeltheeffects
of domestic saving on growth by introducing FDI as a channel of technological
innovationandthefinancialsectorasthemonitoringagencyofinvestmentprojectsin
a frameworkofbackwardand technology frontiercountries. In thismodelgrowth in
the laggardcountryrequiressaving,effortsbyentrepreneursandthe involvementof
FDIwiththerequisiteinnovationknow ?how.Thelocalfinancialsectorattractsforeign
investors by co ?financing investment projects with borrowers. 55This co ?financing
attracts FDI since the financial sectorhas an incentive in ensuring thatprojects are
successful,otherwiseitstandstoloseitsportionofcapital.Thecrucialpredictionhere
is that the financial sector, inpoor countrieswithhigh saving,willbewilling to co ?
finance a greater number of investment projects andwith this interest (and stake)
monitoringattractsFDIbyensuringreasonablereturnsontheir investments.56Inthe
caseof frontiercountriessavingsarenotrequiredtoattractFDI,astheyarealready























better development record compared to those that are inward oriented. This
hypothesiswas tested byBalasubramanyam et al. (1996) in an endogenous growth
framework.Thisframeworkisidealbecausemostofthecharacteristicsofgrowthcan
be initiatedandnurtured (Zhang,2001:177) throughFDI.Theendogenousgrowth
modelemphasizes the roleofhuman capital, technology andR&D, allofwhich are
bundled in FDI. To achieve this aim they estimate aproduction function, classifying
countriesasimportsubstitutingorexportorientedaccordingtowhethertheyachieve
sometrade/GDPthreshold.TheynotethatthegrowtheffectsofFDIinexport ?oriented
countries will be greater because the distortion of tariff ?induced FDI can be
neutralized, thus resourceswillbeemployedoptimally.Theyuse thegrowth rateof
GDPasthedependentvariableandthestockofFDItoGDPasthevariableofinterest,
other controls include exports, labour, and total investment toGDP to capture the




business cycle effectsor random fluctuations57, findingsmaybebiased.Contending
that the state of the current literature has not sufficiently addressed the many
econometric problems associatedwith testing this relationship, Carkovic and Livine
(2002)takeafurtherlookattheexogenouscomponentofFDIanditseffectongrowth.
Using twodifferentdata sets inadynamicpanel,afterbackingoutpotentialbiases,
theyobservenorobustrelationshipofFDIenhancinggrowth.Thisprovidescautionto





policymakerswho introducepolicies to attract FDI,believing that thiswill improve
growth, especially those that are distortionary (e.g. tax breaks only to foreign
investors,whichdisadvantagedlocalfirmsandotherindustrialpolicieswhichfavoura
particular sector in an industry). The literature suggests that in the absence of
absorptivecapacities,growthinthepresenceofFDImaybeelusive.

RajanandZingles (1998)argue that financialdevelopmentplaysasupporting role in
growthbyreducingthecostoffinancingtofirmsthatwouldhaveotherwiseprevailed
duetoadverseselectionandmoralhazardandtheallocation inefficiencythatarises.
Goingastep further,HermesandLensink (2003)contend thatadeveloped financial
system isaprerequisite forFDI topositivelyaffectgrowth.Thishasbeen supported
empiricallyon thebasisof cross ?sectionandpanelestimationmethod,with various
measuresof financialdevelopmentand stability tests.They therefore implorepolicy
makers to get the financial system right in order to take advantage of the growth
prospectofFDI.

But even this studyhasnot gone farenough to address thepotential identification
problemthatmayarisebetweenFDIandthefinancialsystem,asthereisastrongcase
that FDImay precede a good financial system. The implication here is that a good
financial system isnotaprecondition forFDI to improvegrowth, rather thegrowth
effectsofFDIallow the institutionsofacountry including the financialsystem tobe
improved. This has been established in the growth literaturewhereby as a country
grows its economic and political institutions are modernized, especially to sustain







many developing countries, an exogenous inflow of FDI serves to enhance the
economic and political institutions that in turn will attract further inflows and
contributetogrowth.Thusitisnottheinitialdevelopedfinancialsystem(whichhardly









FDI on economic growth and find that FDI only matters when the host country
achievesacertainlevelofhumancapital(i.e.educationalattainment).Inmostoftheir
specifications (after grouping countries according to some arbitrary level of human
capital threshold) FDI returns a negative coefficient on its own. This suggests that
countrieswithlowhumancapitaldevelopmentdonotbenefitfromFDI:theeffectof
FDIoneconomicgrowth isdependenton the levelofhumancapitalavailable in the
host country (Borenszteinetal.,1998:134).These studies indicate thatdeveloping
countrieswillnotbenefitfromFDIoverandabovetheadditiontocapitalstock,asthey
almostalwayssufferfromanunderdevelopedfinancialsystemandlowhumancapital
capacity. Indeed, disadvantages of these sorts are themajor reasons for trying to
attractFDI in the firstplace. In fact,getting the financialsystemrightand improving
educational attainment (which is often used to proxy human capital) require policy
continuity (fromonepolitical administration to theother) and resource availability;
thesearechallengingtasks indevelopingcountries,especially in lightofthefactthat
the financial sector isoneof themainareas forextractivebehaviourby theprivate
sectorandpoliticalelites.

This is implied by Temple (2003) who argues that the financial crisis (1997 ?98) in
IndonesiawasexacerbatedbySuhartosacceptanceofdeep ?seatedcorruptionand










This is themain thrustof the chapter,providingempiricalevidence that thegrowth
effectsofFDIindevelopingcountriesaredirect,i.e.notconditionalonvaluesofother
determinants (although this does not generalize to a sub ?sample of LAC), while
acknowledgingthatthiscanbeaugmentedbylocalconditions:levelsofhumancapital
and financialdevelopment.Hence the answer to economic growthmightnotbe as
difficultindevelopingcountriesasimpliedbyBronzsteinetal.(1998)andothers.Ina
similarspirit,deMello (1999)usesbothtimeseriesandpanelestimation techniques
and, after grouping countries based on income levels, did not reach a conclusive
outcome concerning the growtheffectsof FDI.He thereforeengages in speculation
suchas  ifFDI isgrowth ?enhancingthismaybegreater indevelopingcountries.
He predicates this guess on the convergence hypotheses. Nunnenkamp and Spatz
(2004)maintain that the inconclusive results inprevious studiesareamplified ifFDI
stocks are considered instead of flows: the relationship between a LDCs stock of




Notwithstanding theirownadviceand thewarning fromCaves (1996),Nunnenkamp
andSpatz (2004)use thestockofFDI in regressions to test for theeffectsofFDIon
growth.58Theytooclaimthatfavourablehostcountryandindustrycharacteristicsare
necessarytogeneratebenefitsfromFDI.Itisnotdisputablethatthesecharacteristics
matter, what is disputable however is that they are indispensable for developing
countries to generate growth from FDI. Lensink andMorrissey (2006) did not find
convincingevidenceaboutthegrowtheffectsofFDI,buttheyproviderobustsupport




the1990s.Thiswasaperiodwhen theworldanddeveloping countries inparticular
experiencedunprecedentedFDIinflows.Theyusedatafortheperiod1990 ?97andfind
someevidenceofFDI ?enhancinggrowthincross ?countryregressions,butthiswasnot










Yao (2006)usesmoderneconometric techniques (GeneralisedMethodofMoments)
and a relatively long time frame (28 years) to assess the remarkable economic
performanceofChinaoverthepast25years.Chinahasbeenthe largestrecipientof
FDI inflowsamongdeveloping countriesover thepast fewdecades.This case study
highlights the roleofFDIandexports inChinaseconomic success,even though the
empiricalsupportforFDIwaspositivelysignificantonlyatthe10%level.Inadditionto
using relatively efficient econometric techniques, the current essay goes further by





thenpolicymakers fromotherdeveloping countries candraw lessons and calibrate
themto localexperiencesto improveeconomicperformance.The ideaofcalibration
tolocalexperiencesservesasanescapefromthetrapoftheone ?size ?fit ?allmistake









directly in 32% of the sample, this they note as unexplained mechanisms. They









possibility of this direct growth effect.Modern econometric tools are available for





















































































































aremainly from theWorld Bank,WorldDevelopment Indicators (2006), the Cross ?
nationalTime ?seriesDataArchive(2003)andthePolityIVProject(2004).Wedrawon
theupdated versionofBarroand Lee (2000) forameasureofhuman capital.60The
numberof countries remain68, comprising the samemixof LatinAmerica and the







FDI ismeasured asnet FDI inflows as apercentageofGDP in a country (deMello,
1999;RamandZhang,2002;Alfaroetal.,2004).StudieshaveusedthestockofFDIto
GDP (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004; Balasubramanyam et al., 1996) or gross FDI
inflowsasaratioofGDP(Borenszteinetal.,1998;CarkovicandLevine,2002;Hermes
andLensink,2003;LensinkandMorrissey,2006).Asweare interested in theroleof







































Figure (1) plots the relationship between net FDI/GDP and growth; although
observations of low FDI exhibit no consistent relationship with growth, a positive





GDP,constraintson theexecutiveuseofpowerand initial incomepercapita (this is
includedtocontrolforconvergenceorinitialconditions).Oneofthemajorchallenges
facingdevelopingcountries (notablyHaiti inLAC,Pakistan inSouthAsiaandmostof
SSA) is low literacy of the working age population, hence the lack of human
development,giventhebeliefthatexpandingeducationpromotesgrowthhasbeena
fundamentaltenetofdevelopmentstrategy(Pritchett,2001:368).Theaveragegross
secondary enrolment61rates for Pakistan and SSA (average) are 29% (2002 ?06) and
28% (1999 ?2005),respectivelyandanecdotalevidence indicatesagloomypicture for
Haiti. This is reflected in the slow ratewithwhichmodern technologies have been







suggestsa strong relianceon imitationand copying from thenorth,buteven these
requireaminimum threshold levelofhumancapital thatmanydevelopingcountries
are not able to achieve. Absorptive capacities through a literate labour force are
essential not only to spur growth, but also to sustain growth. Therefore if poor








but distort growth; when supply of educated individuals outpaces demand and
technologythisreducesreturnsonlabourandmakesitlessproductivethanotherwise;




total factor productivity. Borenzstein et al. (1998) measure human capital by the
averageyearsofmalesecondaryschooling.A literatework forceservesasaconduit




There isageneralview in thegrowth literature that sound institutionsaregood for
growth, especially in developing countries given their poor political, social, and










inGleaser et al., 2004). That institutions affect the performance of economies64is
hardlycontroversial,[and]thatthedifferentialperformanceofeconomiesovertimeis
fundamentally influenced by the way institutions evolve is also not controversial
(North,1990:03).Acemoglu(2003) identifiesthreekeyfeaturesofsound institutions:
enforcementofpropertyrights,constraintsonpoliticalelitesorotherpowerfulgroups
and some amount of equality in opportunities. He asserts that lack of education,
dysfunctional markets, 65 outdated machinery and technology are only proximate
causesofpoverty inpoor countries,and thedeeperdeterminantoperating through
these channels is poorly functioning institutions. Rodrik (2007) adds to this by
identifying regulation, macroeconomic stabilization, social insurance, and conflict
management institutionsaskeytohigh ?qualitygrowth inamarketeconomy.Rodrik
(1999) also shows that countries that were disproportionately affected by the
downturn in the world economy after 1975 had poor institutions of conflict
management.

Rodriketal. (2004)confirms theprimacyof institutions (the ruleof lawand risksof
expropriation),indetermininggrowth,overtradeandgeography.66Weuseconstraint
on the executive67(XCONST) from the Polity IV Project (2004) to measure good
institutions in developing countries as is often used in the growth literature. This
measuresuggeststhatpoliticaleliteshave less freedomtomakepopulistpolicies,or
thosethatsatisfyafew influential interestgroups,orrentseekingbypoliticiansthat
are not growth ?enhancing. The measure closely reflects the regime type as
participatorydemocracy;althoughacrudemeasureoftheinstitutionalenvironment,it





















Inkeepingwith the literature, the ratioof liquid liabilitiesof the financial system to
GDP is used to capture the development (or depth) of the financial system
(Borenszteinetal.,1998;HermesandLensink,2003).Alfaroetal.(2004)suggestthatit
is the broadest measure of financial intermediation, as three types of financial
institutions are included: the central bank, deposit banks and other financial
institutions.One of the principal signals of an undistorted economy is its ability to
allocatecapitalwhere thereturn is thehighest.Themotivationhere is thatastrong
financial systemwill eliminate leakages by ensuring that resources are allocated to
theirmost efficient use resulting in economic growth. This is the position taken by
Schumpeter(1911)68whoreckonsthatfinancialdevelopmentprovidesanoversightfor
technology innovation and economic development. King and Levine (1993) find
supporting evidence that financial development improves both current and future
































GDPCit=ȕ1FDI/GDPit+ȕ2HCit+ȕ3FDI/GDPit×HCit+ȕ4Y0+ȕ5ȟit          (1)                                                    
                    +ȥi +İit 


where GDPCit is real GDP per capita growth, i, t are countries and each five ?year
period respectively, and FDI/GDPit isnet FDI inflows in country i at time t,HCit is
humancapitalmeasuredastheaverageyearsofschoolinginthepopulation25years
and older, FDI/GDPit × HCit is an interaction term to capture the complementary
effectofFDI andHC ongrowth,Y0is thenatural logarithmof initial incomeat the
startof each five ?yearperiod, ȟit is the vectorof other controls. The latter includes
financialdevelopment (FinDev), constrainton theexecutive (XCONST),ameasureof







İit (this can be assessed using the Hausman Test of no ?correlation under the null
hypothesis).Throughadifferencingtransformation(whichsubtractsoutȥi),themodel
canbe consistentlyestimated, thusallowing for in ?sample69predictions tobemade.
Controlling for country ?specific effects and exploiting the time series nature of the
panel is an improvement on simple cross ?section OLS regressions, which exclude
meaningful information and are likely to suffer from omitted ?variable bias (due to













Potential endogeneity is not accounted for, however, by using thesemethods and
instrumental variable techniques have been developed to address this potential
problem,most notably the dynamic panel generalizedmethod ofmoments (GMM)
estimator due to Arellano and Bond (1991). The dynamic panel GMM estimator is
adopted toaddresspotentialendogeneityofoneormore regressors in (1)andwill
permitconsiderationofpotentialreversecausality.ThedynamicpanelGMMestimator




dynamic panel GMM estimator in an augmented Solow framework. The point of
Hoefflers (2002)was toshow thatAfricaspoorgrowthexperience isexplainedby










    ɭit  = ȕ* ɭi,t-1 + Ȗ xit + ȥi + ɽit                                               


where ȕ*=( ȕ+1), t, i denotetimeandcountriesrespectivelyandxit isthevectorof
explanatoryvariables includingFDI/GDPit;ȥiandɽit arecountry ?specificeffectsand
an error term respectively; ɭi,t-1 is introduced to proxy for convergence effects (i.e.
initial income lagged one period), as is standard in growth regressions. In order to










 ǻ ɭit =  ȕ* ǻ ɭi,t-1 + Ȗ ǻ xit + ǻ ɽit  ,        for     t = 3,,T               (3) 
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
Byconstructiontheregressor(ɭi,t-1 - ɭi,t-2)andtheerrorterm(ɽit - ɽit-1)arecorrelated,so
anOLSestimatorwillbe inconsistenteven ifthevectorofregressorsxit isexogenous
(Hoeffler,2002).Tosolvethisendogeneityproblemvalid instrumentsarerequiredto
instrument for ȕ* ǻ ɭi,t-1 = ȕ( ɭi,t-1 - ɭi,t-2). The errors  ?itare serially uncorrelated and
independentacrosscountries i.e. E(ɽit  ɽis)=0 , wheresт tand the initialcondition
satisfyE(ɽit ɭi1)=0,wheretш2.

Note ɭi,t-2 isa valid instrument forǻ ɭi,t-1, since it isuncorrelatedwith ( ?it ? ?it ?1)and
correlatedwith(ɭi,t-1 - ɭi,t-2).Further,because ?i,t ?2ispredeterminedwithrespecttoxit -1
, values lagged two periods or more are valid instruments therefore endogenous
regressors in (3) can be consistently and efficiently estimatedwith first differenced
GMMestimator.All these instrumentsaregenerated internallyand combined inan
efficient manner by the GMM estimator to resolve the potential problem of
endogeneity in(3),which makesGMManappealingestimationmethod(Nkurunziza
andBates,2003:15).Theappropriatenessof instruments isestablishedbyusing the
Sargantestofover ?identifyingrestrictions.Hoeffler(2002)includestheinvestmentto





















































Notes: P ?value are below coefficient in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level, **
significantat the0.05 level,* significantat0.10 level.Estimatesare for five ?yearaverages.
POLSusesrobuststandarderror.LACandSSAarecontinentaldummiesforLatinAmericaand
theCaribbeanandsub ?SaharanAfrica,respectively.TheHausmanTestdidnotrejecttheREas







growth. FinDev is liquid liabilitiesof the financial system toGDP; it isusuallymeasured as




Most variables have the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels
(exceptthecomplementaryeffectofFDI×HC,which isnegative inPOLSandRE).The






growth; as in Bronsztein et al. (1998), SSA and LAC dummies are negative and
significant, as is often found in cross ?section regressions (Barro, 1991; Levine and
Renelt, 1992; Alfaro et al., 2004). The coefficient on FDI is positive and significant
across allmodels.Wedonot replicate themain finding inBronsztein et al. (1998),
which suggests that FDI positively affects growth conditional on human capital




growthmay be conditional on the values of other variables in the host countries;
Alfaro et al. (2004) andHermes and Lensink (2003) argue that for FDI topositively
contribute to growth recipient countriesmust attain aminimum threshold level of
financial development. This is based on the allocation efficiency over investment
projects and the efficiency of mobilizing savings generated by a robust financial
system.Accordingly,good financialsystemscanhelpmonitorafirmsmanagersand
exert corporate controls, thus reducing the principal ?agent problems that lead to


















































Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level, **
significantat the0.05 level,* significantat0.10 level.HC×FDI is interactioneffectofhuman
capitalandFDI.FinDev×FDIisinteractioneffectofFinancialdevelopmentandFDI.POLSisbased
on robust standard errors. Countries with negative FDI inflows have been treated as zero
inflows.Whenwe include domestic credit provided by the private sector to proxy financial
development, results were not affected. See also notes to Table 3. All regressions have a












within the rangeof thoseofTable3. LensinkandMorrissey (2006)didnot findany
evidence that the effect of FDI on growthwas conditional on a threshold level of




Asnoted, it is importanttoaccountforendogeneity,especially insofarasthisrelates
to the causal relationship between FDI and growth. For example, the levels of FDI
inflowsmaybetheoutcomeofthetypesofregimesinacountryorsomeotherpolicy
variables (exchange rate) that is not included (or may not be observed). Hence
including FDIwithout controlling for these possibilitiesmight capture the effect of
those variables and not the true relationship between FDI and growth. There are
mixedviewsaboutthechoiceofregimesthatare importantforgrowth,butbecause
regime typesarealso important indeterminingFDI, regressinggrowthonFDImight
justbecapturingtheeffectsofregimechoicesinsteadoftheeffectsofFDIongrowth
that we are after (ormore obviously, FDI is endogenous and responds to growth
performance).A similar argument applies to the relationship between the financial
systemandFDI.Borenszteinetal.(1998)useathree ?stageleastsquaresestimatorto
address potential endogeneity between growth and FDI. Alfaro et al. (2004)
instrument financial development with origins of a countrys legal system and
creditors rights. The justification is that these instruments are exogenous
determinantsofacountrys financialsystem.Toaccessvalid instruments inorder to
getaroundtheendogeneityproblem,weuseadynamicpanelestimationtechniqueas





























Notes:P ?valuesarebelow coefficients inparentheses.***Significantat the0.01 level,*
significantat0.10level.DIF ?GMMisthefirstdifferenceGMMspecificationandSYS ?GMMis
thesystemGMM specification.M1is the testofno first ?orderserialcorrelationandM2is
the testofno second ?order serial correlation.The J (Sargan) statistic is the testofover ?
identifyingrestrictionsof instrumentsvalidityunderthenull.Allexplanatoryvariablesare
their own instruments. DIF ?GMM uses 3 and 4 lags and SYS ?GMM uses 4/6 lags.
Specifications use robust standard error. SYS ?GMM includes a constant term. Full time





is significant and lagged initial income is insignificant. For the systemGMM,human
capital is significant and lagged initial income and FDI are insignificant. The system
GMM istheHoeffler(2002)preferredmethodastheestimatorcombines inasystem
the regression in levelswith the regression indifferences toprovide a larger setof
instruments i.e. lagged levels of the series are used to instrument the differenced
equation and lagged differences of the series are used to instrument the level
equation.

The efficiency of the system GMM over the differenced GMM depends on the
assumptionofno second ?order serial correlation in the residualsand the J (Sargan)
testof instrumentvalidity.  InthesystemGMMtheJ(Sargan)testrejectsthenullof
instrumentalvalidity;hencetheextra instrumentsofthesystemGMMarenotvalid.
For the first differenced specification the M2 test suggests no second ?order serial
correlationintheresidualsandtheJ(Sargan)statisticofinstrumentsvaliditysuggests
that our specification passes these diagnostic criteria. For these reasons the




ismeasuredas the investment/GDP ratioandhumancapitalas theaverageyearsof
schooling,hence a direct comparison of results is notpossible.However, FDIhas a











































































forno first ?orderserialcorrelationandM2is the test fornosecond ?orderserialcorrelation in
the residuals..The J (Sargan)statistic is the testofover ?identifying restrictionsof instruments
validityunder thenull.Allexplanatoryvariablesare theirown instruments.Specificationsuse
robuststandarderror.Fulltimedummiesareincluded.LnYt ?1isinitialincomelaggedoneperiod.




After we control for endogeneity with the GMM estimator, the main result is








argument iswrong.To the contrary,developingcountries shouldactivelyencourage
FDI inflows,becauseof theevidence forgrowth ?inducingeffects.Anotherconsistent
finding is that themeasure of institutional quality exerts a positive and significant
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
influence on growth, an indication that the institutional environment in which
economicactivities takeplace isan importantstimulus foreconomicgrowth.Hence,





increase in institutionalquality increases economic growthon average .95%,71a 1%
increase in FDI increases economic growth on average .71%. 72Many developing
countries particularly those in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) have not
experienced respectable growth rates in their historical economic performance. For
example,averagepercapitaGDPgrowth for this largegroupofsmallcountrieswas,
0.5%,0.4%and ?0.5%inthe1970s,1980s1990srespectively73.Assuggested,itisnot
as difficult for developing countries to benefit from the growth effects of FDI; the
challenge is how to get foreign investors to relocate their plants in developing
countries.ThisobservationreflectsapointmadebyHoeffler(2002)inthatdeveloping
countriesliketheACParenotdestinedtoslowgrowthperformanceduetopoorinitial
conditions;what these countriesneed todo is findwaysofattracting investorsand
controllingtheirpopulationboom.





(Borensztein et al., 1998, emphasis added). It is noteworthy that all of our
specificationsyieldnosignificanteffectinteractingFDIwithhumancapitalorfinancial
development. One suggestion is that levels of human capital and financial



















experience of LAC, particularlywhether FDI contributes to economic growth in the
region.Economicgrowth isabenefit; though itdoesnotaffectallagentsequally, it
providestheresourcesforgovernmentstoassistthoseleastaffected:throughbuilding
schools,buildinghospitals,improvinglawenforcementandotherpublicgoods,which
markets fail to provide because of the disproportionate social ?private pay ?off. The
WashingtonConsensusargues forapassive role for the state ineconomicactivity
andproposes thatmarketsshouldbeallowed tocorrect themselveswhere they fail.
Markets by themselves, however,will not provide services that have public goods
characteristics; therefore governments intervention is required to correct these







populist regimes that actively engage in economic activity through state ?own
enterprisesand redistributionpolicies (andeven today,mostnotablyVenezuelaand
Bolivia). The consequences are a bloated government that crowds out private
investment, creates rent ?seeking behaviour, and generates corruption and
inefficienciesresultinginpooreconomicgrowth.Perhapsamoresevereimplicationof
apopulist regime is societaldispute createdbyunequaldistributionof rentsamong
competing interest groups. Stiglitz (2002) suggests thatmost of the thinking in the
WashingtonConsensus inthe1980swas inresponsetoproblems inLAC:excessive
government intervention in economic activity resulting in huge budget deficits and
loosemonetarypolicyresultinginhighinflation.

LAC countriesare relativelypoor,witha largenumberof theirpopulations living in




in attracting FDI and its poor economic performance, the contribution of FDI to
economic growth is the key question for LAC; we systematically investigate the


























































































economies in the1980shashighlighted the so ?called lostdecadearising from the
debtcrisisandsubsequentIMFstabilizationprogrammes.







Hence generating growth requiresmore than just stabilization (DeGregorio, 1991).
ThepositivegrowthofChileandColombiaunderliestheirreformandexternalcredit
worthiness respectively (Loayzaetal.,2004:04). In the1990smostLACeconomies
recoveredfromnegativegrowthratesexperiencedinthe1980s,butstillbelowlevels
of 1975 ?79. This positive trend continues to mid ?2000, except for Haiti which is























Table 8 shows that Asian countries grew at faster and sustained rates than LAC
countries.Theaveragerateofgrowth forLAC is:1.81% (1975 ?79);  ?1.20% (1980 ?90);
1.60%(1990 ?00);and1.27%(2000 ?05).Asiasgrowthratesoverthesameperiodsare:
3.29; 3.40; 3.49; and 3.67. This comparison is consistentwith the negative dummy
observedforLAC(BarroandLee,1994;Tables3 ?4above)andpositiveforAsia(Barro
andLee,1994).Economicgrowthcanbeexplainedbymanyfactors,andanumberof

















of private capital formation on growth in a small open economy. They empirically
implement their model using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique;
governmentconsumption is introduced indirectlythrough itseffectonprivatecapital
formation.Theirfindingsare:totalgovernmentconsumptionadverselyaffectsgrowth
by crowding out private investment, but the different components affect private
investmentandthusgrowthdifferentlyexpenditureonhealthcareimprovesprivate
investment,whiledefence spendingdiscouragesprivate investment. Theynote that











Yit = Ȗ0 intercept + Ȗ1Zit  + İit                               (4) 
 
 
In (4) Yit is real GDP per capita; Zit is a vector of potential growth determinants:
FDI/GDP,Human capital, Indexofeconomic freedom (EFW),externaldebt/GDPand
totalgovernmentconsumption/GDP.EFW isaproxy forgovernance from theFraser







Sanchez ?Robles (2003) is that no account is taken of potential endogeneity, we






































































convergence; poor countries growth faster than their rich counterparts. As these
estimates dont control for endogeneity, they cannot be treated as robust
determinants.Tocontrolforpotentialendogeneity, lagged independentvariablesare
used,thesub ?sampledoesnotpermittheuseoftheGMMestimatorwhenNissmall








































Introducing lagged independentvariablesweakenstheresults inTable9.ForFEonly
themeasure for conditional convergence retains its signand significance. InRE, the
measureforinstitutionshastheexpectedsignandissignificantatconventionallevel.


































10.We focuson the FE, as this is thepreferredmodelbaseon theHausman Test.
Human capitalasmeasuredby theaverage yearsof schoolingof thepopulation25
yearsandolder induceseconomicgrowth,thiscontradictspreviousfinding inthefull
samplewhichdoesnotfindacomplementaryeffectwithFDIordirectly.Thispositive




capital is integral to theeconomicperformanceofa countryboth in sustainingand


























by human capital and financial development, they are not prerequisites as current
thinkingsuggests.However,theabsenceofevidence insupportofconditionaleffects
mayalsosuggestthatthecountriesinoursamplehavenotattainedthethresholdlevel
ofhuman capital and financialdevelopmentbelowwhich interactioneffectsdonot
affect growth. The fact that we have found direct evidence linking FDI to growth
suggeststhatFDI isgrowth ?inducingeven intheabsenceofa literateworkforceora
developed financial system.Thisparallels the idea that indeveloping countrieswith
growth (or lack thereof) below potential (which creates large scope for improve
efficiency),reforms inapositivedirectionwillstimulategrowthperformance(theso ?
calledadvantagesofbackwardness).Thischapterupdatestheevidencepresentedby
Alfaro etal., (2004),Hermes and Lensink (2003) andBorensztein etal., (1998)who
suggest that developing countries growth prospect, in the presence of FDI, is
hamperedbypoorfinancialdevelopmentandlowhumancapitalrespectively.

Having identified the direct role of FDI in boosting growth, policy makers and









craftingpolicies that are attractive to FDI, thisdoesnot require a complete shiftof








As a final step, we systematically test for the effect of FDI on growth in 20 LAC
countries, as few studieshave focusedon LatinAmerica (DeGregorio,1991;Nazmi
andRamirez,2003;BengoaandSanchez ?Robles,2003).OurfindingsuggeststhatLAC
canboosteconomicgrowthby investing inhumancapitaldevelopmentandFDIdoes
not inducegrowthdirectly inLAC.Thiscontrastswithevidence from the fullsample
thatFDIpromotesgrowthindevelopingcountriesingeneral.Theimplication,then,for
LACgovernments isnotonly tocreateaccess toeducation for theirpopulations,but
also to emphasize the quality of human capital development. As suggested by the




of LAC, we do not interpret this to discriminate against our results in developing
countries ingeneral.For thereason thatLAChas reachedarelativelyhigher levelof
human capital development than say SSA75, and this lower level of human capital
development may account for the insignificant effect in developing countries in
general. However, the evidence is clear, what is growth inducing in developing



















































































































things equal, faster growing economieswill have higher inflows of FDI and higher
levelsof FDIwill boost yet faster growth in the recipient country. This is especially
possible in thecurrentwaveofglobalizationwheregoods,services,capital,and toa







With this kind of assumption, these theoretical models give confidence to
development agencies and national governments believing they can cherry ?pick
development policies thatwill improve economic performance. Butmany of these
influentialtheoriesdonotemphasisetheshort ?termdynamicsofcapitalliberalisation














(2000), this makes the case for FDI stronger in developing countries, so capital
liberalisation policy should crowd out short ?term capital (with strong state
intervention)andcrowdsinFDI.BecauseFDIhaslonger ?termpredictabilityrelativeto








investigate thiseffect,whether faster growingeconomies stimulatehigher levelsof
FDIand if theremightbea feedbackeffectofhigher levelsofFDIgenerating faster
growth in the recipient economies,with a simultaneous equationsmodel, using a
three ?stage leastsquares(3SLS)estimatorsimilartoLiandLiu(2005).Wegobeyond
manypreviousstudiesthatjustlookattheunidirectionalrelationshipfromgrowthto
FDI or the other way around, for e.g. Nair ?Reichert and Weinhold (2001). This is
important,inlightoftheadhocapproachtowardpoliciesindevelopingcountries,asit
will provide a better understanding of the relationship between FDI and economic
growthand informthepolicy ?settingagenda. Indeed overthe lasttwodecades,FDI




Wealso introducepolitical instability in the simultaneousequations frameworkand
show thatpolitical instabilityhasdifferentdimensionsand thereforeaffectsgrowth
andFDIdifferently.Finally,weconsiderthequestionofwhetherthesedimensionsof
political instability affect SSA differently relative to a global sample of developing
countries:wefindweakevidencethatpoliticalinstabilityaffectsSSAdifferently.

The restof thechapter isorganizedas follows.Section2discusses the literatureon
capitalflowsandpossibleconsequences.Section3looksattheempiricalliteratureon











Allpoordeveloping countries,with low saving ratesandanaemiceconomicgrowth,
welcometheinflowsofforeigncapital(bothFDIandtheshort ?termvariety,butmore
so FDI): this enhances the surplus of the international reserves.And thus provides




inflows in the international reserves can smooth the demand for foreign exchange
betweenpeaksand troughs in thebusinesscyclewithout severeadverseeffectson
the real economy.More important, capital inflows provide the discipline for policy
makers to apply goodmacroeconomicpolicies; this is a restrictionon expansionary
macroeconomicpolicies tocoincidewith thepoliticalcycle,which isnot likely tobe
time ?consistent,asinvestorsanticipateareversalinthefuture.

Theexcess inflowsof foreign capital,however, generatesmoreeconomic activities,
which if leftuncheckedwillappreciatetherealexchangerate, inaflexibleexchange
rateregime,andthusdeterioratethecurrentaccountdeficitthroughchanges inthe
relative price of tradables. The possibility of the real exchange rate appreciation
increases ifdomestic inflation ratesarehigher relative to tradingpartners inflation
rates,whichisalmostalwaysthecaseindevelopingcountries.Unliketheirdeveloped
counterparts, adisproportionate shareof the trade volume indeveloping countries









and1990s,useexchange rate targetingasananti ?inflation strategy (LatinAmerican
countriesexperience someof thehighest ratesof inflation in recentmemory).This
results in high interest rate, over ?valued exchange rate, and low inflation, which
attract foreign investors, but this increases the exchange rate risk because foreign
investorswereintentontryingtopredictthetimingoftheexchangeratecorrection
(Garcia, 2004: 13). But, if a developing country government expects that foreign
investorsanticipateacorrectionoftheover ?valuedexchangerate inthefuture,they
will try to defend the currency by further increasing the interest rate. This further
amplifiestheexchangeraterisk,asdevelopingcountriescannot infinitelydefendthe
exchangerateagainstdepreciation,asthecostsofoutputandunemploymentwillbe






timingofa crisis.They find that thedeviationof theexchange rate from trend isa
signal of possible currency crisis.While capital inflows provide important signals of
goodinvestmentconditionsindevelopingcountries,Calvoetal.(1993:110)arguethat






A further risk posed by the inflows of capital in developing countries is over ?
intermediation of credit: this moral hazard results from inefficient allocation of
resources to risky projects, because of the implicit assurance of government
guarantee, and weak institutional structure. This is also possible in developed
countries,where the failureofoneormore importantprojects canadverselyaffect
theeconomy,evenwithgoodinstitutionalstructure.Arecentcaseinpointisthebail








Further, Mishkin (1998) suggests that governments should make an explicit
commitment to provide a safety net against adverse shocks in the economy,
because of information asymmetry (i.e. foreign investors are not sure who
governmentwillguarantee),asforeign investorswillnotenterthedomesticmarket,
limiting the flows of FDI that provides long ?term commitments. Accordingly, the
government can reduce this risk by providing a general guarantee to all potential
investors.Thishasthepotentialforinvestorstoengageinexcessivelyriskybehaviour,
however. Itsworth noting that the IMF has a key role to play in this respect: by
ensuringthatdevelopingcountrieswhichfacefiscalconstraintsget IMFsupport,this






less to dowith sound economic fundamentals andmore to dowith opportunistic
behaviourmotivatedbygovernmentsofdevelopingcountries.Dooley(1999)explains
the incentive for such position: in the absence of government guarantees foreign








Another consequence of foreign investment is to bid up domestic asset prices in






More recently, capital inflows in rich countries have resulted in unsustainably high
housing prices with the effect of sharply reducing when the market starts its
adjustment, thus transmitting negative shocks in the economy i.e. contractionary
effects through reductions inhouseholdwealthand consumer spending.This is the





This illustrates that in theirquest forhigher returnsabroad, foreign investment can
generate unintendedmacroeconomic consequences and these aremore severe for
poor ?developing countrieswith frail institutional structure. Like exchange rate risk,
theseadverseconsequencesareminimizedifthecapitalinflowsareFDI,asFDIisnot






grim: in 1996 inflows to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and






This isevenmoreurgent, asdeveloping countries facing sharp slowdown in capital
inflows usually have little recourse to international financial institutions funds and,
whentheydo,thesecountriesfacestringentfiscalretrenchment,whichresultsinhigh
political cost arising from social dislocation, and severe economic adjustment. And
because developing countries are likely to cut off from the international capital









tomake the firstmove,preferring to adapta follow the leader strategy.Calvoand
Reinhart (2000) document the experience of developing countries facing capital
inflowsslowdown, intheabsenceofexternalfinancing,whichhavetoaccommodate
theseadjustments.For instance,Argentinahadtoadjusttocapital inflowsslowdown





A further complication facing developing countries during a period of capital
slowdown, inaworldwheremarketsare interconnected, is intraregionalcontagion.
Economicshocks inonecountryare likelytospreadtoothereconomies inthesame
regionand these result in investorsnotonlypostponing investmentdecisions in the
firstcountry,butalsointheentireregion.Forexample,KaminskyandReinhart(1998)
concludethatthedevaluationoftheThaibaht in1997spreadtoothereconomies in
East Asia through a series of devaluations and stock market shocks; there was
evidenceoffire ?saleofFDIinEastAsiaalso.

Thisparallelstheexperience inLatinAmerica inthatthetequilaeffects inMexico,of
1994, spread to other economies in the region. The same holds true for African
economies where political violence in neighbouring countries creates negative
externalities forothercountries,causingsomeobservers tocategoriseAfricaasone
unstable country, instead of a group of countries. Furthermore, there are also
interregional contagions among developing countries and between developed and
developing countries (but there is a twist, the contagion effects seem to run from
developedtodevelopingcountriesratherthantheotherwayaround),assuggestedby
the latest bout of international capital inflows slowdown, the insulation of many



























are essentially two approaches to address the endogeneity problem in economic
variables within the context of FDI and economic growth: the single ?equation
approachthatsimplyallowsforbilateralcausaltestingorusesinstrumentalvariables
to account for endogeneity and the less frequently used system of simultaneous
equations approach (Li and Liu, 2005: 395). Unlike the traditional causal single ?
equation approach, a system of simultaneous equations (basically an instrumental
estimation technique)allowsus toexplicitly investigate thepotential feedback loop
between FDIandeconomicgrowth.Hencewewillnowbeable tomake conclusive
statementsabout thepotentialendogenous relationshipbetweenFDIandeconomic






in both single equation and a system of simultaneous equations, using three ?stage







and developing countries in their estimations and since both groups of countries
obviouslyhavedifferentcharacteristics, itsnotclear thatsimilarresultsshouldhold
forbothgroups.For instance,developedcountriesgrowthratesaremorepersistent
relative todeveloping countriesand sincemore FDIgoes todeveloped countries in
absolutevalues, itspossible that their resultsaredrivenby these facts.Onewayof
addressing this potential heterogeneity is by splitting the sample between the
differentgroupsofcountries.Moreover,atanapplied level,theirresultsarenotthe
mostinformativeintermsofpoliciesintheaveragedevelopingcountries.Thatisnota
concern in thisessay,aswe focusonlyondevelopingcountries;hence,anyeffect is
informativefordevelopingcountriesingeneral.

Nair ?ReichertandWeinhold (2001)useamixed fixedand random (MFR) coefficient
approach to allow for heterogeneity in the causal relationship between FDI and
economic growth in a panel of 24 developing countries over 1971 ?1995. The
motivation of the authors is not to assume that the coefficients on explanatory
variables across developing countries are the same, which would have otherwise
impliedthat eithercausalityoccurseverywhereor itoccursnowhere (Nair ?Reichert
andWeinhold,2001:157).Itsworthnoting,however,thatwhiledevelopingcountries






country provides important lessons for other developing countries; grouping
137

developing countries together thus treating coefficientson explanatory variables as
homogeneous,webelieve,isthereforenotanimportantsourceoferror.Forexample,
inEssay1,wedidntfindsubstantialdifferencesbetweenLACandnon ?LACcountries
on the determinants of FDI, except along the lines of infrastructural quality.Using
informationonChinasdata,HsiaoandShen (2003) findevidenceofabidirectional
relationshipbetweenFDIandgrowth.Theyextendthisstudytoinclude23developing





However, theMFR estimator is a single ?equationmodel inwhich the authors only
investigate thecausal relationship fromFDI toeconomicgrowth.Andwhile there is
evidence of this effect, they suggest this relationship to be highly heterogeneous




laggedequity foreignportfolio investmenthave causaleffecton growth,but this is
largelydependenton the institutional structures incountries.A similarexercisewas
done by Reisen and Soto (2001), but they use a GMM estimator to account for
causality.TheytoofindFDIandportfolioequityascausinggrowthintheirpanelof44
developing countries. We push beyond the single ?equation approach and apply a




stage least squares) to Taiwans data inwhich output growth and FDI are treated
endogenously. They find the causal relationship between growth and FDI to be









until after the countries have exhibited growth, showing that trade and financial
restrictionsdoindeedimpedetheinflowofforeigncapital(Basu,etal.,2003:516).

Following the accession to EU of eight former centrally planned economies, using
similar technique as Basu et al. (2003), Mencinger (2003) finds opposite results,
confirmingthatFDIhasacausaleffectoneconomicgrowthandthiseffectisnegative.
He asserts a story to support the empirical finding: arguing that during the post ?
transitional phase government supports rapid privatisationwith little investment in
Greenfield projects and most of the proceeds from sales were absorbed in
consumption goods reflected in the ratio of the volume of exports to imports. In
contrast toMencinger (2003), inaVAR frameworkusing theGranger ?causality test,




HansenandRand (2004).Theyusea levelequationand findsupportofFDIGranger
causing growth across 31 developing countries from 1970 to 2000. They also find
evidence of composition effect in the sense that a higher ratio of FDI in capital





across the three regions investigated:Asia, LatinAmerica,andAfrica.Criticising the
traditional Granger ?causality test for its weakness in identifying forward ?looking
relationship between economic variables, Chowdhury andMavrotas (2006) employ
theTodaandYamamoto (2005)methodologytotest forthedirectionofcausality in
Chile,Malaysia, and Thailandover a33 ?yearsperiod. Theyposit that the Toda and
Yamamoto (2005) technique is an improvement on Granger ?causality testing, as it






Hsiao (2006) incorporatea third linkexports.Usingdata fromEastandSoutheast
Asiasfastestgrowingeconomies,theyreportacausallinkfromGDPtoFDIandfrom
exportstoFDI inChina,fromFDItoexportsandfromexportstoGDPforTaiwan,no
causal link inHongKong, fromFDI toexportsand fromFDI toGDP forSingapore,a






Having reviewed theempirical studieson thepotential causal relationshipbetween
FDI and growth, the statistical evidence that emerges is that the literature is not
settled.Somestudiesposita linkfromFDItogrowth,whileotherstudiesarguefora
link from growth to FDI, and still others report a two ?way link. This iswithin the
contextofpanelcross ?countrystudiesandtimeseries,butfindingsofcasestudieson
single country do not converge. Because FDI has competitive advantages in
international tradeandanopen trade regime isexpected tobenefit from improved
economic performance through access to a largermarket, exports have also been
identifiedasapossiblechanneltoexplainthecausalrelationshipofFDIandgrowth.
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yig = =cigȤg + Ycigȕg + İig ,g = 1, , G  ,    i = 1, , N(1)

WhereZgisavectorofpre ?determinedvariablesthatareorthogonaltotheerrorterm




Yci ȕ + =ci ȥ = İi,                                (2) 
 
 
the vector of endogenous variables is given by Yi = [yi1 , ,yiG]c, =i is the vector of 
exogenousvariables (zi 1, ,ziG) i.e.all the instruments, İi = [İi1,, İG]c where ( (İ İc) 
= 6 and ( (İ) =0 and ȕ and ȥ areparametermatrices.Toderivethereducedformwe 
maketheendogenousvariablesthesubject,whichyields:
 
                                       Yci =  ?=ci ȥ ȕ-1 + İi ȕ-1          
and
 
                                           Yci = =ci ȟ + ĭi                                                     (3)
 
whereȟ = -ȥ ȕ-1denotestheparametersandĭi = İi ȕ-1denotestheerrors.(3)canbe
estimatedby standardOLS,but theestimates are inconsistentdue to identification
problems.Having satisfied the rank condition (which is sufficient for identification),
whichholdsthatthesetofinstruments=icandtheendogenousvariablesYcimustbe
correlated,efficientestimatesareobtainedfrom(1)byapplyingthe3SLSestimator.In
the structural model all dependent variables are treated as endogenous and are
instrumentedbytheotherregressorsinthemodel.The3SLSestimatorisobtainedin
threesteps:weobtainthepredictionofʇfrom(3)byOLSandusethistorecoverthe




The simultaneous relationship of economic variables is almost always present in
statistical investigation.Thishas longbeen recognised inempirical studies,hence a
system of simultaneous equations can correct the restrictions that any excluded
equationhasonasingleequation. Forexample, ifoneassumes that theeconomic












FDIit = E1GDPCit  + E2Sit + Qit                           i = 1, , N           t = 1 ,, T(4)






capita incountry i,andS isallthesignificantcontrolvariablesfromEssay1:DEBTSG
fordebtburden, INFRAS for infrastructural quality, XCONST for governance quality,
andINFLAfor inflation.&  isallthesignificantcontrolsfromEssay2,they include:Y0













Theadvantageof thisapproach is that iteliminates country ?level fixedeffects from
theerrordisturbances.Baltagi(1981)developedanerrorcomponentthreestage ?least
squares(EC3SLS)77estimatorapplicabletoasystemofsimultaneousequationswithin
apanel framework.Heasserts that theadvantageof theEC3SLSover the standard
3SLS isthatthe latterdoesnotmakeanyassumptionabout theerrorcomponentof
the model i.e. does not account for the fixed effects in the error disturbances;
estimateswill thereforebebiased. Taking deviation from themeans,however,will
eliminate the fixed effects in the error disturbances. Cornwell et al. (1992) also
developeda3SLSestimator,applicable toa systemof simultaneousequations fora
panelframework,similartoBaltagi(1981).Analternativeapproach istoestimate(4)
and (5)equationbyequation; this isnotefficient,however,as itdoesnotallow for
correlationacrosserrordisturbances.Theadvantageof the latterapproach is that if
oneoftheequationsismiss ?specifieditdoesnotcontaminatetheotherequations.

Beforeweproceed toestimate thesystemofsimultaneousequations (4)and (5)on
the transformed model, we first perform a Durbin ?Wu ?Hausman (DWH) test for
endogeneityonthefullsample.Ifthenullofnoendogeneity issignificantlydifferent
from zero, then a single ?equation estimator is biased and IV estimates based on a




ɍ = E1 X + E2P + İ 

                                  X = E1 ɍ + E2 H +Q 

Weconstruct thereduced formequationwith˄asa functionof theexogenous (we
taketheseasinstruments)regressorsW











If P is significantly different from zero we take this as evidence of endogeneity
between the dependent variables and hence a system of simultaneous ?equations
estimator is required to produce relatively efficient estimates. The DWH test of
endogeneityontheresidualofthetransformedsystem(4)and(5)returnsap ?valueof
(0.000)ishighlysignificant,thusrejectingthenullofnoendogeneityandconfirmsthe
endogenous relationship between FDI and GDPC. Estimations that ignore this
endogeneitywillproducebiasestimates.

In the following section we estimate the transformed system of simultaneous
equations (4) and (5),using the IV 3SLS estimator.Greene (2003: 407) asserts that
amongall IVestimators thatuseonly sample informationembodied in the system,
































               INFRAS                                    .004 
(.000)***
               INFLA                                     ?.001 
(.001)***
               GDPC                                     .196 
(.002)***
               XCONST                                  .028.083 
(.624)                                 (.446) 
               LnY0                                                                                ?5.398 
                                                                                                      (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                 .960 
                                                                                                      (.000)***
               HC                                                                                  .468 
                                                                                                      (.056)*
               SSA                                                                                 ?.210 
                                                                                                    (.420)
               LAC                                                                                ?.216
(.399)
              Observations                           293293                             
              R2                                           0.260.19 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, *
significantatthe10% level.Bothregressionshaveaconstantterm.DEBTSG isdebtburden,




























                                                (.000)***






               LnY0 ?5.318
(.000)***
               FDI                                                                                 .926 
                                                                                                      (.001)***
               HC                                                                                .592 
(.011)**
               
              Observations                         293293                    
               R2                                         0.250.19 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level.
Regressionshaveaconstantterm.DEBTSGisdebtburden,INFRASistheinfrastructuralquality,
GDPC is GDP per capita, INFLA is inflation, Yo is initial income, and HC is human capital.




All variables retain their sign, size and significance. FDI and growth retained their
significance at the 1% level; further evidence suggesting that FDI and growth are
causallyrelated.Withtheexceptionofoneortwo,forexampleBotswanathatgrows
at an average rate of 9 percent for the past thirty years (Stiglitz, 2006), growth
experiencesamongSSA countriesaregenerallypoor; thisprovidesenormous scope
for improvement ineconomicperformance.AndSSA isthe leastattractiveregionfor
FDIinflows,giventheunstablepoliticaleconomy,exceptforresourceseekingFDI:the






one ?off inflow toapoor region that shifts it fromabad toagoodequilibrium.We










               INFRAS                                   .005 
(.000)***
               INFLA                                     ?.001 
                                                           (.001)***
               GDPC                                    .077 
(.319)
               XCONST                                 .139.049   
                                                           (.027)**(.717)   
               LnY0                                                                               ?5.688 
                                                                                                    (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                1.035 
                                                                                                    (.002)***
               HC                                                                                 .259 
                                                                                                   (.494)
              Observations                            188188                                    
              R2                                           0.340.21 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significantat the5% level.Both regressionshavea constant term.DEBTSG isdebtburden,
INFRAS is the infrastructural quality, INFLA is inflation,GDPC isGDP per capita, XCONST is
institutional quality, Yo is initial income, and HC is human capital. Regressions used
transformedsixfive ?yearaverages:1975 ?79,1980 ?84,1985 ?89,1990 ?94,1995 ?99,and2000 ?
05.Augmented regression residualwithaP ?value (.000) rejects thenullofnoendogeneity





The augmented regression suggests that there is endogeneity (p ?value, .000) in this
portion of the sample between FDI and growth. For the FDI equation, INFRAS and
INFLAretaintheirsize,sign,andsignificance,XCONSTisnowsignificant,andgrowthis




of the endogeneous relationship between FDI and economic growth and this is not
driven by a groupof countries thathave apoor ?growth record,which provides the








rateshavedominated thoseof LACandSSAand they receivehigherFDI inflows, in
absolute value on average, relative to LAC and SSA. These countries have also
introduced radical policies which facilitate a pass through of improved economic
performance to the real economy from FDI activity. For example, Chinas policies
towardFDIencouragelocalresidentstohavepartownership.Theideahereistolimit
themaximum repatriationof economic rent.And partownership alsoprovides the
incentivefor localresidentsto influenceFDIactivitiesthatwillhaveoptimumeffects
ontheeconomy,notonlyeconomicreturnsbutalsopreservingthelocalenvironment.
Rodrik (2009) concludes that by using industrial policies, China encourages foreign
investmenttotransfertechnologytoboostexportsqualityaboveitsincomelevel:this
partly explains its dynamic ?growthpath. It is, therefore,possible that this groupof
high ?growthperformersandrecipientsofdisproportionatesharesofFDIinflowscould
be driving the causal effect of FDI and growth in the sample. To account for this




























               INFRAS                                   .005 
(.000)***
               INFLA                                   ?.001 
(.000)***
               GDPC                                    .259 
                                                           (.000)***
               XCONST                                 ?.018                                  .123 
                                                           (.764)                                 (.271)   
               LnY0                                                                               ?6.288 
                                                                                                    (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                 .965 
                                                                                                    (.000)***
               HC                                                                                  .385    
                                                                                                    (.080)*
               Observations                           261261                      
              R2                                         0.260.22 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, *
significantatthe10% level.Bothregressionshaveaconstantterm.DEBTSG isdebtburden,
INFRAS is the infrastructuralquality, INFLA is inflation,GDPC isGDPper capita,XCONST is
institutional quality, Yo is initial income, and HC is human capital. Regressions used
transformedsixfive ?yearaverages:1975 ?79,1980 ?84,1985 ?89,1990 ?94,1995 ?99,and2000 ?






Theaugmented regressionwithp ?value (.001)on the residual indicatesendogeneity
betweenFDIandgrowth.Allvariables in theFDI regressionare significant,with the
expectedsign,exceptXCONST.Threevariablesappeartobe important inthegrowth
regression;weareinterestedintheendogenousrelationshipbetweenFDIandgrowth,
all other variables are treated as control. The proxy for institutional quality is
insignificant in the FDI regression. FDI retains its significance and is positive and
growth is significantwith theexpected sign:providing further support that FDIand





halves,each consistsof three sub ?periods,1975 ?79,1980 ?84,1985 ?89and1990 ?94,
1995 ?99,2000 ?05.Were ?estimateourmodelforeachtransformedhalfofthesample.
The trends toward liberalisation inmanydevelopingcountrieswere intensified from
149





revolution that improved the way business was conducted. Thus, we expect a







                                                            (.093)*
               INFRAS                                   ?.004 
(.251)
               INFLA                                    ?.0003 
                                                            (.106)
               GDPC                                    .049 
                                                            (.280)
               XCONST                                  ?.017.074  
                                                            (.819)                                (.809)   
               LnY0                                                                               ?9.582 
                                                                                                    (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                3.045 
                                                                                                    (.119)
               HC                                                                                  .325 
                                                                                                    (.578)
               SSA ?.036
(.934)
LAC ?.179 
                                                                                                    (.934)
Observations                         134134                     
              R2                                       0.10 ?0.05 
Notes: P ?valuesarebelowcoefficientsinparentheses.***Significantatthe1%leveland*Significant























                                                            (.000)***
               INFRAS                                    .003 
                                                            (.000)***
               INFLA                                      ?.001 
(.010)***
               GDPC                                     .164 
                                                            (.023)**
               XCONST                                  ?.254.524 
(.034)**                              (.006)***   
               LnY0                                                                               ?10.132 
                                                                                                     (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                  1.041
                                                                                                     (.002)***
               HC                                                                                   .960 
                                                                                                     (.018)***
               SSA.039
(.883)
LAC.072 
                                                                                                     (.791)
Observations                             159159                     









sample.This isconfirmedbythe insignificantresidual intheaugmentedregression,a
p ?value (.169) doesnt reject the null of no endogeneity. This is, however, not
supportedby thepositively significant FDI and growth coefficients in the systemof
simultaneousequations;thisisnotwhatweexpectiftheresidualisinsignificantinthe
augmented regression. All other variables are significant with the expected sign,
exceptfor institutionalquality intheFDIregressionandregionaldummies ingrowth
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level,
**significantat the5% level.Both regressionshaveaconstant term.DEBTSG isdebtburden,


















sampleofdeveloping countries,but theeffect is stronger for theperiod1990 ?2005
relative to the period 1975 ?1989. This is not surprising; as noted, FDI inflows to
developingcountrieswere larger for theperiod1990 ?2005anddevelopingcountries
recorded someof thehighest ratesofgrowthduring thisperiod.Technologieshave
improved over the years, which imply that FDI has enhanced their production
techniques,all this stands to increaseproductivityandhencehighergrowth for the
host country. In principle we would expect FDI and growth to have a relatively
stronger causal effect in the period 1990 ?2005; this is supported by the evidence.
However,thesurprisingresultisthateventhoughthereisevidenceofendogeneityin
the period 1975 ?1989, growth and FDI coefficients are insignificant in Table 5. The




have internalised all their economic rent and whatever positive effect is passed
throughtorecipientcountriesisnotsufficienttostimulategrowthandinturnattract
higher levels of FDI. For instance fragmentation of production has reduced the
benefits for host countries (MNEs reap the gains);during this periodpolicymakers
werestilltryingtounderstandthedynamicsofFDI.AlargeproportionofFDItakesthe
form of services and acquisition of infrastructure (e.g. water and electricity) and
mergers,which are less beneficial compared to greenfield investments.MNEshave
becomesophisticatedintheirabilitytocircumventrestrictionsthatwouldallowthem
to share their returnswith recipient countries. This reflects the political power of
MNEsinwhich,Ifgovernmentsdecidetotaxorregulatetheminwaystheydontlike,
they threaten tomoveelsewhere (Stiglitz,2006:188).Andbecauseothercountries
arewillingtoacceptFDI,thethreat78tomoveelsewhereservesasanincentiveforFDI

78InThailandandPeru,corporations threatened tomoveelsewhere ifenvironmental regulationswereenforced; in






to demand economic rent to the disadvantage of the host country. This is an










and investment as evidenced in the growth literature. Taken together it is not
surprisingthatwedidnotidentifysignificantcausaleffectbetweenFDIandeconomic
growth in the first half of the sample, in spite of the evidence of endogeneity.
However, significant causal relationshipbetweenFDIandgrowth is identified in the
latterhalfofthesample.

Our results support evidence by Chowdhury andMavrotas(2006) forMalaysia and
Thailand,HsiaoandHsiao(2006),andHsiaoandShen(2003)andothers(seeappendix
to essay, Table 1A).But the studies closest toours are:Benede ?Nabende and Ford
(1998),LiandLiu(2005),andReisenandSoto(2001).Similartoourstudy,the latter
studiesincludealargesetofcontrolvariablesandapplysimilartechnique.Inthecase
of Benede ?Nabende and Ford (1998) and Reisen and Soto (2001)we test a larger
sample.AndLiandLiu (2005) findevidenceofendogeneityeffectonly intheperiod
1985 ?99,9years into theperiod forwhichwe find significantcausaleffectbetween
FDIandgrowth.

Thekeydifferenceswith thisessay is thatourstudyextends to laterperiods,which
makes itmorecurrentandweconductextensive falsificationchecks (and thecausal
effectbetweenFDIandgrowthisstable)torefuteorconfirmthecausaleffectofFDI
and growth that we have identified. The extensive falsification checks provide a
clearerwayoflocatingthedirectionoftheeffect.Andwedontbelievethatitsdriven
bycyclicalvariation inthedata,astransformedsixfive ?yearaveragesandthreefive ?
yearaverages (even thoughwedidnt findevidenceofendogeneity)ofTable6give
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In this section we introduce political instability in the system of simultaneous
equations(4)and(5),assessingitseffectonFDIandeconomicgrowthinoursampleof
developing countries.Violence andmore generallypolitical instabilityhave afflicted
many countries,butAfrica isoften citedas the regionmostaffected.Quoting from
MarshalandGurr(2005),BlattmanandAnnan(2009:01)assertthatCivilconflicthas
afflicted a third of all nations and two thirds of Africa since 1991. And political
instability isnota recentphenomenon;Blomberg (1996)argues thatbetween1950






grievances (ethnicor religious,political repression,politicalexclusion,andeconomic
inequality) longafter the restorationofnormalcy.CollierandHoeffler (2004)argue,
however, that grievances dont adequately explain political instability and instead
suggestthatopportunities inthesenseof increasedexportsofprimarycommodities
and diaspora support, for example, have stronger explanatory power. Dube and
Vargas (2008) corroborate this argument by reporting evidence on the differential
effects of price shocks of factor ?intensive commodities on political violence for
Colombia.Theyreportthatincreasesincoffeepricesalabourintensivecommodity
reducepoliticalviolencebymakingitlessattractiveforrecruitmentinparamilitaryor





restricting the development potential of developing countries, as investment
opportunities and thus economic growthbecomedistorted,both contemporaneous
and over longer horizon. A politically unstable country will potentially destroy its
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intellectual capital bymaking itmore rewarding to engage in corruption andother
activitiesthatgeneratedistortions.Seenthroughthislens,politicalinstabilitydistorts
incentives for development, but its also possible that some dosage of political
instabilitymightbenecessarytomoveacountrytoagoodequilibriumbyremovinga
corruptregimefrompoliticalofficesoastorestoreconfidenceingovernance.Wecall
this productive instability, purging of distortions and inefficiencies in governance
through the forces of political instability, whether by constitutional means or
otherwise.

There is some empirical evidential support for this line of thinking. For instance,
Campos and Nugent (2003) find that political instability is positively related to




(BlattmanandMiguel,2009:58).The keypoint is that crises canengenderpositive
economicandpolitical reforms, thus increasing thedisincentivesof inefficiencyand
otherdistortionsleadingtoproductivityandhigheroutputgrowth(CerraandSaxena,




development broadly and economic growth in particular. Cerra and Saxena, (2005)
demonstratethatcountriesthatexperiencepoliticalcrisestakealongertimetoreturn
topre ?crisisgrowth levels relative to thosewhichexperience financialcrises.Abadie
andGardeazabal(2003)documentthemagnitudeofpolitical instabilityoneconomic
performancearisingfromtheterroristattacksoftherebelgroupETAontheBasque
country in Spain. They find that these attacks account for a 10% decline of the
Basqueseconomycompared toacounterfactual regionseconomywithout terrorist
attacks,andevenstockmarketsrespondtothisinformation.

Political instabilitynotonly affects thehome country,but can also adversely affect
neighbouringcountries.Forexample,MurdochandSandler(2004)findthatacivilwar




in the long runand24% in the short run; they furtherargue that themagnitudeof
thesedeclinescanbelargerifthespilloverofthesenegativeexternalitiesonthehome




developing countries bear a disproportionate share. These are people who were
initially constrained due to low human capital, poor health status, and other
environmental restrictions fore.g. frequentdroughts.Theseafflictionsareamplified
when interactedwithanadditional layerofcivilconflict,especially if these conflicts
are not anticipated so that precautionary measures can be instituted, therefore






distribution, and not surprisingly, women were more likely to be affected. This
complementsarecentstudybyDupasandRobinson(2009)ontheeconomicimpacts









for thechannel throughwhich inequalityaffectsgrowthandprovidesevidence that
inequalityreducesgrowthviatheperceptionofpolitical instabilityasopposedtothe
actualmanifestationsofpoliticalinstability.Theimplicationisthathowthepolitiesof
developing countries are viewed, and this feeds future expectations, by private
investors and influential multilateral agencies perhaps set the stage for growth
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potential.Similarly,Svensson (1998)usesa largesample (100)ofpoorcountriesand
reportsthatpolitical instabilitydepressesprivate investment,butthisoccursthrough
dysfunctional institutions.Theexplanation is thatapolarised society invests little in
legal infrastructure,whichcreatesdisincentivesforprivate ?investmentaccumulation.
Investment and growth are identified as channels throughwhichpolitical instability





In thissubsectionwere ?estimateoursystemofsimultaneousequations, (4)and (5),
withvariousdimensionsofpolitical instability.Jong ?A ?Pin(2009)empiricallyteststhe
effects of political instability on economic growth, using different dimensions of




guerrillawarfare and purges dont affect growth outcomes, especially if they dont
resultinlootingofprivateenterprisesandriots.

The author uses 25 indicators of political instability to construct fourmeasures of
political instability, using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) method: violence,
protest,instabilitywithintheregime,andinstabilityoftheregimeeachisexplained
by different sets of indicators. Within a dynamic framework, he finds that only
instability of the political regime is consistently causally related to growth. EFA is
basedonamodel structure. It separatesvariableswith sharedvariances, to forma
factor, from those with unique variances. In other words, it reveals any latent




method  and the Kaisers criterion. The scree test holds that a factor with large
evigenvalues (above one) and the Kaisers criterion suggests that a factor with
evigenvalues aboveone shouldbe retained. Inboth caseswe check these selection
criteria with a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test by comparing the factor model with the
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saturatedmodel:a rejectionof thenull ?hypothesisofequalestimates (between the
factormodelandthealternativesaturatedmodel)confirmsthefactormodel.Dueto
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aboveoneare relevant inexplaining thedifferentdimensionsofpolitical instability,
fourdimensionsofpolitical instabilityare identifiedasdisplay inFigure1.However,
theKaisers criterion shows thatonly three factorshaveeigenvaluesexceedingone
and LR test (p ?value 0.00) rejects the null ?hypothesis of equality in support of the
threefactorsmodelagainstthealternativesaturatedmodel(ofall8factors inFigure
1).Wethereforeconcludethatonlythreefactorscorrectlyexplainpoliticalinstability.




























We use theMaximum Likelihoodmethod to identify the factors, as it reflects the








guerrillawarsare labelledviolence.No indicatorhascross ?loadings (i.e.explaining
morethanonefactor),anindicationthatpoliticalinstabilityhasdifferentdimensions.





    FDIit = E1GDPCit  + E2Sit + E3.it +Qit                        i = 1, , N          t= 1, ,T              (6)

   GDPCit =E1FDIit  +  E2&it + E3.it +Dit                          i = 1, , N         t= 1, ,T             (7)


Notes: The factor extractionmethod isMaximum Likelihood. Factor loadingmatrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod.Estimatesarebasedon68 countries.Dataare from the









instability to have a negatively significant effect on FDI and growth. We recast

















































                                                                (.000)***
               INFRAS                                  .004 
                                                            (.000)***
               INFLA                                      ?.001 
                                                            (.000)***
               GDPC                                     .180
                                                            (.005)***
               XCONST                                 .040                                   .156   
                                                            (.499)                                (.149)  






               LnY0                                                                               ?5.498 
                                                                                                    (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                  .930
                                                                                                     (.000)***
               HC                                                                                   .355        
(.148)
               SSA                                                                                  ?.191 
                                                                                                     (.463)
               LAC                                                                                  ?.175                                          
                                                                                                      (.492)
              Observations293293 
              R2                                           0.270.24 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significantatthe5%level.Bothregressionshaveaconstantterm.DEBTSGisdebtburden,INFRAS
is the infrastructuralquality, INFLA is inflation,GDPC isGDPper capita,XCONST is institutional
quality,Yoisinitialincome,HCishumancapital,SSAisadummyforsub ?SaharanAfrica,andLACis
Latin America and the Caribbean dummy. REGIME, PROTEST, and VIOLENCE are various






Two dimensions of political instability turn out to have the expected sign and are
significantatconventionlevelsinstabilityoftheregimeandprotest.FDIandgrowth
arepositiveand retain their significance.The introductionof thepolitical instability
measures improves the fit of the model. In this section we are interested in the
differentdimensionsofpoliticalinstability.Theresultssuggestthatpoliticalinstability










                                                            (.000)***
               INFRAS                                   .004 
(.000)***
INFLA                                     ?.001 
                                                            (.001)***
               GDPC                                      .148  







               FDI                                                                                 1.191 
                                                                                                       (.000)***               
          Observations                        337                                        337                 
               R2                                        0.260.16 
Notes:P ?valuesarebelowcoefficientsinparentheses.***Significantatthe1%level,**significant





All variables retain their sign and significance.While the quantitative impact of all
variables is broadly similar, the significance of instability of the political regime
improves. These suggest that mass protests and instability of the regime reduce
growth,while these dimensions of political instability do not appear to affect FDI
inflows.Weexpect thesegrowth ?reducingeffects. Inwhat follows,wedoextensive




afflicted SSA not only in terms of the actual manifestations, but also in terms of
perception (Nel,2003). If thisargument is correct, it ispossible thatour resultsare
drivenbythe31SSAcountriesinthesampleandtheestimatesarenotthetrueeffect
of instabilityoftheregimeandprotests.Toassessthisargument,wedropall31SSA










                                                            (.032)**
               INFRAS                                  .005 
                                                            (.000)***
               INFLA                                    ?.001 
                                                            (.000)***
               GDPC                                    .059
                                                            (.427)
               XCONST                                  .150                               .088   
                                                            (.019)**                           (.510)  






               LnY0                                                                              5.983 
                                                                                                      (.000)***
               FDI                                                                               1.093 
                                                                                                   (.001)***
               HC                                                                                 .123        
(.740)
              Observations188188 
             R2                                            0.340.24 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significantatthe5%level,and*significantatthe10%.Bothregressionshaveaconstantterm.
DEBTSG isdebtburden, INFRAS isthe infrastructuralquality, INFLA is inflation,GDPC isGDP
per capita, XCONST is institutional quality, Yo is initial income, and HC is human capital.
REGIME,PROTEST,andVIOLENCEarevariousdimensionsofpolitical instability.Regressions
used transformed six five ?yearaverages:1975 ?79,1980 ?84,1985 ?89,1990 ?94,1995 ?99and





at the 10% level. It is important to note that notwithstanding the evidence of
endogeniety (p ?value .000) in the model, though remains positive, growth is
insignificant in the FDI equation. Including the different dimensions of political
instability and excluding SSA has dampened the significance of growth on FDI. It
appears, however, that instability of the regime and PROTEST are important in
explaininggrowth,whileviolence isnot likely toexplainFDIorgrowth.Weconduct
furtherfalsificationteststochecktherobustnessoftheseresults.

Countries of East Asia are relatively stable, and they have been rewarded with











































                                                            (.000)***
               INFRAS                                   .005 
                                                            (.000)***
               INFLA                                      ?.001 
(.000)***
               GDPC                                      .251  
(.000)***
               XCONST                                  ?.016                                   .191   
                                                            (.807)                                 (.090)*   





                                               (.950)(.992)
               LnY0                                                                               ?6.408 
(.000)***
               FDI                                                                                   .912 
                                                                                                     (.000)***
               HC                                                                                    .337        
                                                                                                      (.129)
               Observations                             261261                      
              R2                                             0.27                                 0.27 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level,
significantatthe**5%level,*significantatthe10%.Bothregressionshaveaconstantterm.
DEBTSG isdebtburden, INFRAS isthe infrastructuralquality, INFLA is inflation,GDPC isGDP
per capita, XCONST is institutional quality, Yo is initial income, and HC is human capital.
REGIME,PROTEST,andVIOLENCEarevariousdimensionsofpolitical instability.Regressions
usedtransformedsix five ?yearaverages:1975 ?79,1980 ?84,1985 ?89,1990 ?94,1995 ?99,and






remain statistically significantwith theexpected sign.Theeffectof instabilityof the
politicalregimeandPROTESTongrowthisnotaffectedbycountriesthatgrowfastand
relativelystable;theireffectisnotinfluencedbysamplevariations.VIOLENCEhasthe




Blomberg (1996) suggests that the period 1950 ?87 is marked by duly ?elected
governments being removed from office through unconstitutional means. One
implication is that the effectof political instability on economic variables shouldbe
165

relatively stronger circa1950 ?87.Thisperiodoverlapswith the sample1975 ?2005.






                                                            (.061)*
               INFRAS                                   ?.003 
                                                            (.375)
               INFLA                                    ?.0003 
                                                            (.061)*
               GDPC                                     .049
                                                            (.270)
               XCONST                                  ?.107                                  .537   
                                                            (.211)                                (.281)  






 LnY0                                                                               ?9.071
                                                                                                     (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                 3.959 
                                                                                                     (.073)*
               HC                                                                                   .286        
(.609)
               SSA                                                                                  ?.060 
                                                                                                      (.881)
               LAC                                                                                    ?.133                                        
                                                                                                       (.732)
  Observations134134 
             R2                                         0.14 ?0.36 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, *
significant at the 10% level. Both regressions have a constant term. REGIME, PROTEST, and
VIOLENCE are various dimensions of political instability. Regressions used transformed three
five ?year averages:1975 ?79,1980 ?84, and1985 ?89.Augmented regression residualwithaP ?
value(.005)rejectsthenullofnoendogeneitybetweendependentvariables:growthandFDI.
WhenweexcludeSSAandhighgrowthcountriesfromAsiaREGIMEremainssignificant(p ?value
0.012 and p ?value 0.081, respectively), and VIOLENCE is significant onlywhen the latter are
excluded.

PROTEST and growth are insignificant, albeit the latter has the expected sign.
VIOLENCE isnowsignificantwith theexpectedsign in theFDI regression.REGIME is










                                                            (.000)***
               INFRAS                                  .002 
                                                            (.001)***
               INFLA                                    ?.001 
                                                            (.010)***
                 GDPC                                     .142
                                                            (.079)*
               XCONST                                  ?.222    .531   
                                                            (.068)*                               (.004)***  






               LnY0                                                                                ?9.748
                                                                                                     (.000)***
               FDI                                                                                 .975 
                                                                                                     (.005)***
               HC                                                                                   .805        
(.045)**
               SSA                                                                                .033 
                                                                                                     (.903)
               LAC                                                                                .708                                             
                                                                                                      (.777)
            Observations159159 
              R2                                        0.190.20 
 Notes: P ?valuesarebelowcoefficients inparentheses.***Significantatthe1% level,**
significantat the5% level,and*significantat the10%.Both regressionshaveaconstant
term. REGIME, PROTEST, and VIOLENCE are various dimensions of political instability.
Regressions used transformed three five ?year averages: 1990 ?94, 1995 ?99, and 2000 ?05.
Augmented regression residual with a P ?value (.169) doesnt reject the null of no






As in Table 6, there is no evidence of endogeneity in the sample for 1990 ?2005.
However,growthandFDIarepositivelysignificant.Fortheperiod,althoughinstability
ofthepoliticalregimeandPROTESTarestatistically insignificant,theyarenegative in
the growth regression; partly reinforcingwhat is evidenced in the period 1975 ?89
where REGIME is significantly negative.We conclude that the significantly negative
effectofREGIME andPROTESTon growth isnot influencedby eitherperiod in the
sample,butmightbeageneralpatternthat isobserved inthesample(althoughthis




period relative to theperiod1990 ?2005. Ina two ?horse race,betweenREGIMEand
PROTEST, toexplaingrowthREGIMEcomesoutahead.For this reason,we focuson
REGIME.

Three indicators of political instability consistently explain REGIME: constitutional
changes,cabinetchanges,andexecutivechanges(seeappendixtoessay).Theperiod
1990 ?94 is thehighestnumberof constitutional changeson average in the sample,
0.18, forexecutivechanges1990 ?94 is thehighestonaverage,0.19,and forcabinet
changes 1990 ?94 is the highest on average, 0.58. For constitutional changes, forty
countries 79experience the average or above. For executive changes, forty three
countries 80 experience the average or above. For cabinet changes, thirty seven
countries81experience theaverageorabove.Weperformanother robustness check
byexcluding all countries thatexperience theaverageandaboveoneach indicator
and re ?estimate the transformedsystemofequations.Thiswillclarify thepossibility
thattheeffectofREGIMEongrowthisnotdrivenbythesecountriesandalsoprovides
a robustness check on the effect of PROTEST. Table 14 reports results. System (1)













Togo, Tanzania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Nepal, Singapore, Thailand, Algeria, Peru, Nigeria,
Guinea ?Bissau,Madagascar,Malawi,Mali,Mauritania,Mauritius,Mozambique,andNiger.
80Central Africa Republic, Benin, Congo Dem. Republic, Congo Republic, Cote dIvoire, The Gambia, Madagascar,




81Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo Dem. Republic, Congo Republic, Cote dIvoire, Gabon,
Guinea ?Bissau,Madagascar,Mauritania,Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia,









                                 (.080)*(.001)***
         INFRAS              .004.003 
                                 (.000)***(.004)***
         INFLA                ?.001 ?.001 
                                 (.007)***(.943)
         GDPC               .233.124
                                 (.039)**(.369)
         XCONST            ?.012               .251             ?.125.552    
                                  (.909)           (.145)        (.340)(.010)***






         LnY0                                       ?4.1674.523
                                                      (.000)***(.000)***
         FDI                                          .779                                     .286     
                                                                             (.010)***(.455)
         HC                                           .211                                      .610 
(.500)(.111)
         SSA                                          ?.083 ?.249 
                                                       (.848)(.583)
          LAC                                         ?.082                                   ?.250             
                                                       (.791)(.713)
           Observations1421429999 







marginally significant in system (1). FDI and growth have the expected sign, but
significant insystem(1). InTable15,weexcludecountrieswhichexperienceaverage
and above cabinet changes but, because of the sample size, we could not




Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significantat the5% level,and *significantat the10%.All regressionshavea constant term.
REGIME, PROTEST, and VIOLENCE are various dimensions of political instability. Augmented








                                                          (.026)**
         INFRAS              .004 
                                 (.000)***
         INFLA                                    ?.001           
                                (.037)**
         GDPC              .304
                                                    (.003)***
         XCONST                                ?.017                                     .257                
                               (.852)(.059)*






         LnY0                 ?4.697
                                (.000)***
         FDI                                                                                    .910
                                                                                                 (.004)***
         HC                                                                                     .210                                     
(.501)
         SSA                   ?.227 
(.474)
          LAC                                                                                   ?.200 
                                                                     (.511)
          Observations146146          
          R2                      0.300.33 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significant at the 5% level, and *significant at the 10%. All regressions have a constant term.
REGIME, PROTEST, and VIOLENCE are various dimensions of political instability. Augmented





REGIMEhas theexpected signand is significant in thegrowthequation.PROTEST is
insignificantinbothequations.ItsworthnotingthatFDIandgrowtharepositiveand
significant across the system, confirming their causal relationship. These results are
reassuring. The instability of the regime retards economic growth in developing




catch all for all destabilising events in developing countrieswith the potential to
negatively impact economic variables. For example, REGIME and PROTEST retards
170
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variables, especially if the violence is swift, and as noted, to correct distortions in
economic outcomes, for example, preventing expropriation of private investments.
ViolencewiththismotivationisunlikelytoretardgrowthordeterFDI,insteadthiswill
restoreconfidenceintheeconomythusenhancesmediumandlong ?termgrowthand
be attractive to FDI. Furthermore, it seems as though there is a threshold level of
violence (even thoughwehavenot explored thispossibility),belowwhich violence
doesntaffecteconomicvariables.Thetransformationofthepaneldata intoacross ?
sectionframeworkdoesnotallowforthedynamicsofviolenceoneconomicvariables




is that it signals policy inconsistency over the medium to long ?term horizon and
economicindicatorsinternalisethesesignals.Ifcurrentpoliciesarenoguidetofuture





Previous studies, discussed above, that dont take account of the effect of the
differentdimensionsofpolitical instabilityongrowthhavenotprovidedacomplete
treatmentofthisrelationship.Wefindthatpolitical instabilityhasthreedimensions.
Our findings support Jong ?A ?Pin (2009)who finds that political instability has four
dimensions.ButourstudyisdifferentfromJong ?A ?Pin(2009)inatleastoneimportant








Its suggested that SSA is likely to experience relativelyhigher incidenceofpolitical
instability than other regions; if so,what role does political instability play in SSA
growth outcomes? In particular, does political instability affect SSA differently
comparedtootherregions?Weexplorethispossibility inthissubsection.From1960
to 2001 eighty ?two successful military coups occur in Africa (Collier and Hoeffler,
2005)82.Thisunderscoresthefactthat,Africaisthemostconflictriddenregionofthe
World and the only region inwhich the number of armed conflicts is on the rise
(Stockholm InternationalPeaceResearch Institute,1999:20)83.Moreover, In recent
years, then,Africa has supplied farmore than its share of violent political conflict
(Batesetal.,2006:13).ThishasimplicationsforSSAeconomies.Thelevelofpolitical
instability has been a significant factor in the lack of progress experience by the
continents economies (Mbaku and Paul, 1989:63). This implies that SSA is being
punishedfortherelativelyhigh incidenceofpolitical instability.Incontrast,EastAsia
and LAC are relatively stable regions reflected by the higher proportion of
manufacturing FDI inflows. This provides an interesting opportunity to empirical
investigatewhetherSSA isdifferent.However,CollierandHoeffler (2002)show that
SSA isnotprone topolitical instability risksby identifying twooffsetting factors that
make SSA similar to other developing countries: high ethnic and religious
fractionalization,whichmakes itdifficult formilitarymobilizationandcontributes to
pooreconomicperformance.

We pursue a different objective by empirically testing whether political instability
makesitlikelyforSSAtoexperienceslowgrowthorattractlessFDIinflowsrelativeto
other developing countries. Easterly and Levine (1997)84argue that ethnic diversity
explains SSA growth tragedies; they introduce assassination and antigovernment
demonstrations as indicators of political instability. Guillaumont et al. (1999) use
coups, foreign wars and civil wars as their political ?instability index and find that
political instabilitypartlyexplainsgrowth inAfrica.Usingthenumberofgovernment










coups plots as a measure of political instability and finds that political instability
negativelyaffectsgrowthinSSA,whileOjoandOshikoya(1995)usecoupsdétatand
civil libertytoproxypolitical instability inassessingthedeterminantsofgrowthona
sampleofSSA.ArelatedstudybyGhura(1995),usingthenumberofpeopleaffected
by wars, civil conflicts, ethnic violence, and natural disasters as a share of total
population,findssignificanteffectforpoliticalinstabilityongrowthinSSA.

Considering that SSA is often seen as unstable and performs poorly on economic
indicators,exceptforGuillaumontetal.(1999),itssurprisingthatnootherstudyhas
focusedonthepotentialdifferentialeffectofpoliticalinstabilityoneconomicvariables
in SSA relative to other regions.While the latter arbitrarily use the sum of coups,
foreign,andcivilwarstoconstructtheirpolitical ?instabilityindex,wedontadoptthis
approach; this introducesbias in the relationship. Instead,wedontarbitrarilyapply
anystructureonthe indicators,weusetheEFA(anda largersetof indicators,which
providesa richermeasureofpolitical instabilityand thusabetterunderstandingof
whetherSSAisdifferent)whichconstructsdifferentdimensionsofpoliticalinstability.




(2003) who find that Africas slow growth is affected by decline in total factor




construct two interaction terms with the SSA dummy and the two dimensions of
political instability  PROTEST and REGIME  which are likely to affect economic










  FDIit = E1 GDPCit + E2Sit + E3.it +E4Fit +Qit                           i = 1, , N           t = 1 ,, T(8)





where Fit = PROTESTuSSA and Rit = REGIMEuSSA. All other variables remain
unchanged. Again, we transformed (8) and (9) from a panel to cross ?section
framework.MbakuandPaul(1989)assertthattherelativelyhighincidenceofpolitical
instabilityshouldexertadverseinfluenceonSSAeconomicperformanceandBateset
al. (2006) highlight the disproportionate supply of political conflict in Africa,while
CollierandHoeffler (2002) identify twooffsetting factors (ethnicdiversityandpoor
economicperformance) thatmakeSSApolitical instabilityoutcomessimilar toother






























                                 (.000)***(.000)***
         INFRAS               .004.004 
                                 (.000)***(.000)***
         INFLA                 ?.001 ?.001 
                                 (.000)***(.000)***
         GDPC               .178.190
                                 (.004)***(.002)***
         XCONST             .045             .160              .067                   .161    
                                  (.441)           (.144)         (.533)(.143)












         LnY0                                      ?5.684 ?5.583
                                                      (.000)***(.000)***
         FDI                                         .976                                       .951     
                                                      (.000)***(.000)***
         HC                                          .322                                      .365 
(.175)(.127)
         SSA                                         ?.237 ?.183 
                                                      (.356)(.472)
          LAC                                        ?.190                                      ?.183             
                                                                                  (.447)(.462)
          Observations293293293293 
          R2                         0.270.240.260.24 
Notes: P ?values are below coefficients in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, **
significantat the5% level,and*significantat the10%.Both regressionshavea constant term.





We estimate two systems of simultaneous equations as displayed in Table 16, first
withallthree interactionterms(3)andsecondlywithonlytwo interactionterms(4),
togetherwithallthreedimensionsofpoliticalinstability.Oneoftheinteractionterms
ismarginally significantatconventional levels:REGIMEuSSA.Thiseffect,however, is
not robust across the systems of simultaneous equations. Its remarkable how all
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significant variables are precisely estimated across both systems of simultaneous
equations. Based on these results, there is some evidence to suggest that political
instabilityaffectseconomic indicators,particularlygrowth, inSSAdifferently relative
toaglobal sampleofdeveloping countries.This resultdoesnot supportCollierand
Hoeffler(2002)whoholdthattheriskofpoliticalinstabilityinSSAshouldbenohigher
than other developing countries and hence the effect of political instability on
economic indicators shouldbenodifferent.Given the relativelyhigher incidenceof
political instability in SSA as suggestedbyMbaku and Paul, (1989) andBates et al.




Stable regimes, therefore, appear to be important for SSA to improve economic






Thegoalsof thisessaywere three ?fold: to clarify thedirectionof causality, if there
wereone,betweenFDIandeconomicgrowth,to identifythedifferentdimensionsof




Firstly, theextant literatureon thedirectionofcausalitybetweenFDIandgrowth is
mixed. We find evidence to disentangle this ambiguity. FDI and growth are
endogenouslyrelated.Theevidencesuggeststhatthedirectionofcausalitybetween
growth and FDI runs bothways: from FDI to growth and from growth to FDI.Our
evidence supports findingsbyChowdhuryandMavrotas (2006)andHsiaoandShen
(2003).

Given theevidence, it seems then that FDIhas thepotential toenhance growth in
developingcountries(andthishighergrowthwillattracthigherlevelsofFDI),perhaps




to adopt growth ?inducing policies through threats of relocation. Therefore, policy
makers in developing countries who are thinking about growth strategies must






differently. Previous attemptswhich dont account for the different dimensions of
political instabilityarequestionable.We findevidence that instabilityof the regime
andprotestreducegrowth,althoughthe latter is lessrobust.Violencedoesntaffect
growthor FDI; again caution is advisedwhen interpreting this finding, for the very
reason that the cross ?section framework does not account for the dynamics of
violenceongrowthandFDI.ThemainfindingissupportedbyJong ?A ?Pin(2009).

As a final exercise, we ask whether SSA economic performance is constrained





this image is fed by the actual incidence of political instability.Using the evidence
here,thetaskofescapingapotentialpoliticalinstabilitytrapisforSSAtoputtheright









































































































































Notes: Hsng_res is residuals from first stage estimation. Estimates










































































Notes: Hsng_res is residuals from first stage estimation.



























Notes:Hsng_res is residuals from firststageestimation.Corresponds






Factor analysis addresses itself to the problem of analyzing the interrelationship
among a largenumberof variables and then explaining these variables in termsof
their common underlying dimension factor (Hair et al., 1987: 235). Factor analysis
therefore allows for the observe variables to reflect the characteristics of the
underlyinglatentvariables;eachobservedvariableisafunctionofitsunderlyinglatent
variable.This identification isachieved,by isolatingthecommonvariancestructure
(communalities)amongarangeofvariablesinfewerindices(factors),withoutlossof
information in these factors. The key point about factor analysis is that no prior is
madeabout therelationshipbetween themanifestvariablesand the factors (Everitt







































isanullmatrix. Given theassumptionof zero correlationbetween factors,we can












thecommunality i.e.sharedvarianceofp.P constitutes thedifferentdimensionsof
political instabilityandareused inthesystemofsimultaneousequationstoconsider










































































































Notes:The factorextractionmethod isMaximumLikelihood.Factor loadingmatrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod.Estimatesarebasedon37countries.Dataarefromthe






































Notes:The factorextractionmethod isMaximumLikelihood.Factor loadingmatrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod.Estimatesarebasedon60countries.Dataarefromthe














































































































































Notes:The factorextractionmethod isMaximumLikelihood.Factor loadingmatrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod. Estimates arebasedon60 countriesover 1975 ?2005.















































Notes:The factorextractionmethod isMaximumLikelihood.Factor loadingmatrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod. Estimates arebasedon60 countriesover 1975 ?2005.















































Notes: The factor extraction method is Maximum Likelihood. Factor loading matrix is
rotatedwithObliminmethod.Estimatesarebasedon60countriesover1975 ?2005.Data
are from the Cross ?national Time ?series Data Archives (2003). Variance is the unique




































Eversince the firstwaveof liberalisation indevelopingcountries in the1980s,much
emphasis isplacedon theroleofFDI tostimulategoodeconomicperformance.This
links to a large body of research in economics to understand the pathways for
developmentinpoordevelopingcountries;thisthesisaddstothateffort.Inparticular,
themajoraimsof the thesiswere toexamine thedeterminantsofFDI indeveloping
countries (the subject of Chapter 3), the effect of FDI on economic growth in








(e.g.confidence inthepolitical leadershiptoexecutetherightpolicies), inChapter3
weincludeabroadsetofexplanatoryvariablesthatarelikelytoexertinfluenceonthe
location of FDI. In particular, with the appropriate estimator, we assess
macroeconomic indicators, governance indictors, and political instability indicators.
Theimplicationisthatwearenowabletosaysomethingaboutfactorsthatwillaffect
FDI to developing countries and whether this applies across different regions of
developingcountries,inparticularwhetherLACisdifferentfromotherregions.

The second empirical essay (Chapter 4) is grounded in the proposition that
endowmentdeficiencies indevelopingcountriesareunlikelytoeliminatethegrowth
effectofFDI(betterendowmentsand/orpolicy/governancemaybothattractFDIand
strengthentheeffectofFDI),contrarytothe influentialstudies inthe literaturecited
inChapter1.Weevaluatethispropositionandpresentevidencesuggestingthatthe




Given thecase for reversecausalitydiscussed inChapter1, the finalempiricalessay
collectsinChapter5thepotentialdeterminantsofFDIandthepotentialgrowtheffect
ofFDI inasystemofsimultaneousequations.Within this frameworkweareable to
identify the direction of causality between FDI and economic growth in developing
countries, althoughweprefer to interpret the results as capturing correlations and
tendencies(empiricalpatterns)ratherthan inferringcausality.Theempiricalstrategy
adopted here takes the literature a step further in resolving the direction of the
relationshipbetweenFDIandeconomicgrowth:theeffectappearstorunbothways
i.e.fromFDItogrowthandfromgrowthtoFDI.Wehavetwootherempiricalsections
inChapter5. The first takes accountof thepotentialdifferential effectofdifferent
indicesofpoliticalinstabilityonFDIandgrowth;thissupportsthehypothesisthatFDI
andgrowthrespondtoindicesofpoliticalinstabilitydifferently.Second,relativetoits
highgrowthcounterparts inEastAsia,say,political instabilitymightbe important in
explainingwhySSAfailedtoachievegoodeconomicoutcomes.Theevidencesupports





There isa theoreticalbasis toargue thatFDIwill improvehostdevelopingcountries
economicperformance.Inthislight,policymakersacrossdevelopingcountriescreate
policies that are favourable to FDI. In Chapter 3, we evaluate these potential
determinants.Wefindthathighdebt,highinflation,andconstraintsontheexecutive
(XCONST)are likely todiscourage FDI todeveloping countries,while largedomestic
marketsandgood infrastructurequalityare likely toattractFDI.Except forXCONST,
these results are not surprising because high and persistent debt raises concerns
aboutfuturetaxesonbusinessactivitiesandhighinflationreducesrealincome(oneof
thekeymotivationsforFDItolocateabroad).ThenegativecoefficientonXCONSTcan
be explained by low governance in the sample (it should not be interpreted as
suggesting that good governance is bad for foreign investment). In general, FDI is
attractedtocountrieswithbettergovernance,butparticulartypesofFDIareattracted
by country characteristics irrespective of governance. For example, respect for
propertyrightsandotherfeaturesofgoodgovernancearelowinSSAinpartbecause










that infrastructure quality affects LAC differently compared to other regions. In
particular,good infrastructurequalityattractsFDI toLAC,but there isno significant
effect for other developing countries. This suggests that infrastructure is more
important(relativetootherdevelopingregions)forthetypeofFDIattractedtoLAC.
TheeffectforLACtakesaccountofCaribbeancountriessmallislandstates.Theuse
of the GMM estimator orwhere appropriate lagged explanatory variables, a large
number of potential determinants of FDI, and allowing regional variation provide
robustresultscomparedtopreviousstudies.Thatgood infrastructureattractsFDIto
LAC provides more information for policy makers in LAC about development
strategies:a focuson improving infrastructure is likely toattractFDI.Moredetailed
countryandsectorstudieswouldberequiredtoidentifywhichtypesofinfrastructure
(e.g. roads, ports, and telecommunications) are most important in any specific
country.

This supports thegrowthobjectiveofdeveloping countries: FDI isgood forgrowth,
primarilybecauseinvariouswaysitcontributestohigherproductivity.Ourfindingthat
the impactofFDIongrowth isdirect, i.e.notconditionalonvaluesofothercountry
characteristics,suggeststhatthegainsfromhigherproductivityareunconditionalon




ofFDI (they should,andmayalsomake thecountrymoreattractive forFDI).Policy
makers shouldpromoteotherpolicies that support growth, such as sound financial
systemsandaskilledlabour,toattractFDI.

The growth effect of FDI is not the same for all regions. In particular,we find no
evidence that FDI has had a direct impact on growth for LAC.One reasonmay be
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heterogeneity ingrowthdriverswithinLACandhow theserelate to the typeofFDI.
Forexample,manufacturingisrelativelymoreimportantforgrowthinSouthAmerica,
butagriculture ismore important inCentralAmericawhereasservicesmaybemore
important in the Caribbean.While FDI inmanufacturingmay have a direct growth
effect,FDIinagriculture(suchasplantations)orservices(especiallyutilities)mayhave
littleimpactongrowthinthemediumterm.Theeffectofhumancapitaldevelopment
ongrowth is stronger for LAC, thandeveloping countriesasagroup, so conditional





The evidence also suggests that political instability affects growth, but the effect
depends on the dimensions of political instability and appears to vary for different
regions. For example, while instability of the regime and protest affect growth,
violencedoesntappeartoasystematiceffectoneithergrowthorFDI.Tocombineall
indicators into one index of political instability (as others have done) may mask
informationaboutwhichdimensionaffectsFDIandgrowth.Giventhehigherincidence
of political instability in SSA relative to other regions, we find some evidence to




to identify the different dimensionsofpolitical instability addresses this concern in
part. Thus, what appears to matter for growth are protest and instability of the
regime,neitherseemstomatterforFDI,butthelatterseemstoaffectSSAdifferently.
Hence, thehigher incidenceofpolitical instability inSSAdoesexplain lowgrowth in
SSA.Measures that improve institutionsand reduce levelsofpolitical instabilityare
requiredinSSAtoagreaterextentthaninotherregions.

As for the policies we suggest, they will at least expand the options available to
developing countries. But the mapping from policies to improved economic
performance is far from certain. Hence, we dont impress upon policy makers to
completely adopt these policies, as they may not guarantee safe routes to
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As much as we believe that the results in the thesis will nudge policy makers in
developingcountriestoimproveeconomicpolicies,thereareobviouslimitations.First,
we start with the data quality. Data quality on developing countries is poor, this
includesmissingdatapointsandwhen interpolationshavetobemade,theymaynot
accurately capture the counterfactual. We hope that the World Development
Indicators minimize this risk. Even though we include services to capture trade




its own problems: coefficients on aggregate datamust be interpreted in terms of
average values. Many countries in the sample are not average countries: average
countriesdontgrowasslowlyasmostSSAorasfastasEastAsiancountries.Inother
words,whatisrelevantfortheaveragecountrymightbeirrelevantforbothextremes.
So, much information is lost in grouping average countries with those below and
aboveaverageperformance.Still,evenwithinaveragecountriestherearedifferences.
The goal of future research then is to conduct detailed case studies on individual
countries.Theeffectistotesttherobustnessoftheseresults.






we take this approach because of lack of good instruments. We, however, share
criticisms about the inadequacies of lagged values  the dubious exclusion
restrictions, serialcorrelation, [and]permanentcountry factors (Easterly,2008:99).







The results from the thesis, nonetheless, help us to understand those economic
policieswhicharelikelytoimprovedevelopmentindevelopingcountries.Inparticular,
the thesis provides insights on how to increase the inflows of FDI to developing
countries,providesinsightsonthedirectgrowtheffectofFDI,andprovidesinsightson
theendogenousrelationshipbetweenFDIandgrowthandtheeffectofthedifferent
dimensions of political instability on growth and FDI. And we also learn that
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